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Abstract
The usage of formal logic to solve problems in artificial intelligence has a long
history in the field. Information is represented in a formal language, which
facilitates algorithmic reasoning about some domain knowledge. Tradition-
ally, the algorithms used for the reasoning services are monotonic, which
states that adding knowledge never causes the retraction of an inference. A
result of this is that if the knowledge in question contains examples that are
exceptions to stated rules, then the entire knowledge base may become un-
satisfiable. If the knowledge accurately represents the domain, then such a
result is undesirable. One solution is nonmonotonic reasoning, which encom-
passes patterns of defeasible or “common sense” reasoning that may retract
conclusions upon the addition of new information to a knowledge base. One
of the most prominent frameworks for nonmonotonic reasoning is the one
defined by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor (KLM). The KLM framework has
very desirable features both for theoretical study of nonmonotonic reason-
ing, as well as for implementation in AI applications. However, the current
state of the KLM framework spans numerous papers over two decades of
research. This provides a challenge for new researchers to understand the
current problems being studied, as well as to understand the framework well
enough to either extend it or apply it. This dissertation aims to compile the
theoretical work done in this framework to provide a single point of reference
for anyone wishing to understand the KLM framework, as well as to know
how to define a defeasible entailment relation, using homogenised terminol-
ogy and notation that is now typical of the field. Firstly, the propositional
logic used as the base language will be defined. Then, paralleling the way
the framework was historically built up, a preferential semantics over that
language will be described, before modifying the language itself with a de-
feasible connective, and introducing a nonmonotonic entailment relation over
such a language. Then, recent extensions to this framework defining various
classes of defeasible entailment are described. By the end of this dissertation,
the reader should have a well rounded understanding of the KLM framework,
from classical logic to defeasible logic.
Chapter 1
Introduction and Background
Knowledge representation and reasoning is a field of artificial intelligence
that employs formal logic to represent domain knowledge symbolically, which
allows for rigorous analysis of additional knowledge, inferences, implied from
the explicit knowledge [5, 35]. This analysis can be defined algorithmically,
and therefore implemented in the form of reasoning services. These reasoning
services are intended to check for consistency, that there are no conflicts in
the information provided, as well as provide inferences. The set of inferences
derived by a particular reasoning algorithm is dependent on the assumptions
baked into the algorithm. The dominant form of reasoning, referred to as
classical reasoning, is based on Tarskian notions of consequence [56], which
define key properties to be satisfied such that each inference has maximal
support from the explicit knowledge. A side-effect is that classical notions
of consequence cannot reason about exceptional explicit knowledge. In this
context, exceptional refers to information in which there may be examples of
exceptions to stated rules. To use the typical example, a bird has wings and
flies, and a penguin is a bird that does not fly. Therefore, a penguin is an
exceptional bird. In propositional logic, this knowledge could be formalised
as:
• bird → flies
• bird → wings
• penguin → bird
• penguin → ¬flies
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Using the regular, classical rules of drawing inferences, this information infers
both that penguin → ¬flies, explicitly, and that penguin →flies, derived
from the fact that it is a bird. This is an undesirable result, as it implies
that there are no penguins, as either there exists a bird with contradictory
traits, resulting in an explicit contradiction, or there exists no such bird. It
is possible to adjust the above knowledge base to account for penguins as an
exception. However, adding ostriches to the knowledge base will require the
same handling, and so the more exceptions there are, the more adjustments
are required, and the larger the knowledge base becomes and the harder it
is to maintain. Given an existing knowledge base with many hundreds or
thousands of statements, and it may not be at all reasonable to adjust the
explicit knowledge in such a way as to handle such exceptions.
This issue of exceptional information is a direct result of classical reason-
ing satisfying the property of monotonicity. Monotonicity essentially states
that the inferences that hold within any subset of a set of statements, have
to be consequences of the entire set. Another way of stating monotonicity
is that any expansion of some knowledge can only add more inferences, and
can never cause a retraction of any inference. Monotonicity is therefore why
in the above example the inference penguin → flies must always be de-
rived in the presence of the statements bird → flies and penguin → bird,
regardless of any other statements. The solution proposed here is therefore
that of nonmonotonic reasoning.
Nonmonotonic reasoning is an area of research that attempts to formalize
different patterns of “common sense” reasoning, by dropping monotonicity as
a property and investigating how to define reasonable non-Tarskian notions
of consequence. Generally, humans reason by making assumptions based on
their given knowledge, and then revising those assumptions upon learning
new information. This pattern of defeasible reasoning has been mimicked by
a number of different frameworks that were formalized, for the most part, in
the 1980s and 1990s. The aim of this dissertation is to provide an overview
of one of these frameworks, first defined by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor
[46, 48, 49]. Propositional logic will be the basis used for this dissertation,
in keeping with the language used in the original definitions. However, this
framework has been extended to both description logics and modal logics
[19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 37, 38].
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1.1 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 of this dissertation defines the propositional logic that will form
the foundational logic for the rest of this dissertation. The semantics and
proof theory are defined, as is the concept of consequence relations. Chapter
3 is a literature review for nonmonotonic logic, covering a number of vari-
ous frameworks. Chapter 4 then describes preferential logic, starting with
defining preferential consequence relations and the associated preferential se-
mantics. Then, preferential entailment over a defeasible logic is defined, with
the corresponding semantics. Chapter 5 then introduces nonmonotonic ra-
tional entailment relations, starting from rational closure, and then builds
up the framework by defining iterative classes of defeasible entailment. The
final chapter contains a discussion on nonmonotonicity, before concluding




Propositional logic is a formalism for reasoning about knowledge or informa-
tion, abstracted away from a natural language representation into a formal
language, and will form the foundational logic for the rest of this disserta-
tion. Propositional logic is essentially defined by a set of connectives along
with a set of statements, such that more complicated statements may be
constructed by combining statements using the connectives; the truth of the
composite statement is then solely reliant on the truth of the base statements
and the interpretation of the connectives used [5, 35]. In this way, proposi-
tional logic attempts to analyse the truth of statements divorced from their
natural language intuitions. This also allows for defining what it means to
formally reason about some set of such statements, and what can be derived
from a set of such statements.
Propositional logic was chosen as the base logic as it was the foundational
logic chosen by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor to initially define the KLM
framework [46, 49]. It is an easy choice to motivate in general in the context
of artificial intelligence research, as it is decidable but also expressive enough
for results to be translated to more expressive languages. First, the basic
language and syntax will be defined, then the model and proof theory.
2.1 Syntax
The language of propositional logic is built up from propositional atoms, also
called variables or symbols in the literature [35, 63]. A propositional atom
is a statement, or a representation of a statement, and will be formatted
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here in typewriter text, e.g. bird is an atom, as is Socrates. The intuition
is that Bird could be shorthand for a statement, or proposition, such as
“Tweety is a bird”, and, similarly, Socrates might be shorthand for “there
is a philosopher named Socrates”. Atoms are associated with truth values
in the sense that they can be true, referred to as T , or false, referred to as
F . Statements will also be represented using meta variables, denoted with
small Latin alphabet letters: p, q, r... such that, for example, bird could be
denoted as b, without any loss of interpretation. The set of all propositional
atoms will be denoted as P , and is finite. Atoms are combined with the set
of connectives {¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔} to create a set of well formed formulas, from
now referred to as propositional formulas, or just formulas. All of the above
connectives are binary, with the exception of ¬, which is unary, and each
accepts all formulas as arguments. The set of all formulas will be denoted by
L, and elements of L will be denoted by lower case Greek letters e.g. α, β,
γ.... The definition of a formula is recursive, such that any L can be defined
as follows: for some p ∈ P and α,β ∈ L, then α ∶ p, ¬α, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α → β,
α ↔ β. Lastly, define the constants ⊺ ∈ L and  ∈ L: ⊺, read “top”, is a
tautology, i.e., a statement that is always true, and  is the opposite, that is
a statement that is always false. L then defines the syntax of propositional
logic, but how to determine the truth of a formula is not yet clear, nor the
ultimate goal: what new formulas may be inferred from some set of formulas.
There are a number of ways to define inference in propositional logic: here
a model-theoretic definition, using semantics, is presented first, followed by
different, associated formalisms.
2.2 Semantics
The semantics of any logic defines the meaning of truth and allows for sys-
tematic, meaningful analysis of the language. To use the example of ordinary
arithmetic, a sentence x+y = z is neither true nor false until you assign values
to x, y and z. In this case, it is true in the case where {x = 3, y = 3, z = 6}
and false in the case where {x = 4, y = 5, z = 7} [5]. Each of the above
assignments to x, y and z are mappings from x, y and z to the set of inte-
gers, and provide a lens to systematically analyse under what conditions the
statement holds. Using the above two assignments, for example, shows that
it is possible for the statement to be true or false. Satisfaction is the notion
of a statement being true in such an assignment. In this example, the first
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assignment satisfies the statement, and the second does not. It should be
noted that these assignments map to integers, not truth values, which will
be contrasted with the assignments for propositional logic. Valuations, also
referred to as worlds or interpretations in the literature [5, 46], assign truth
to propositional atoms [51], and will be denoted by the small Latin alphabet
letters u, v,w:
Definition 2.1. A valuation u is a function, such that u ∶ P ↦ {T, F} where
T and F are read as true and false, respectively.
That is, a valuation is a function that assigns for every atom in the
language either true, or false. Here, a valuation will be represented as a
sequence of atoms in typewriter text, where a bar over the atom is taken
to mean that said atom is false in the valuation, and true otherwise. For
example, given P ∶= {p, q, r}, a random valuation u ∈ U could be pqr, which
should be read as p and r are true, and q false.
Definition 2.2. If an atom is true in a valuation, then it is said the valuation
satisfies the atom, and satisfaction will be denoted with ⊩, such that for some
valuation u, if it is the case that for some p ∈ P , u(p) =T, then u ⊩ p, and
if u(p) =F, then u /⊩ p. This can be extended to any α,β ∈ L, such that
a valuation u can be said to satisfy any formula in L using the following
criteria:
• u ⊩ ¬α if and only if u /⊩ α
• u ⊩ α ∧ β if and only if u ⊩ α and also u ⊩ β
• u ⊩ α ∨ β if and only if either u ⊩ α or u ⊩ β
• u ⊩ α → β if and only if u /⊩ α or u ⊩ β
• u ⊩ α↔ β if and only if u(α) = u(β)
• u ⊩ ⊺ for every u ∈ U
• u /⊩  for every u ∈ U
Now, define U to be the set of all valuations for our language L. It will be
useful to refer to only those valuations satisfying a particular formula, hence
the following definition:
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Definition 2.3. For any α ∈ L, let α̂ ∶= {u ∈ U ∣ u ⊩ α}. For any u ∈ α̂, u is
referred to as a model of α.
Then, α̂ is a subset of U , referring to only those valuations satisfying α.
For any α ∈ L, α is called a tautology if for all u ∈ U , it is the case that u ⊩ α,
α is said to be satisfiable if there exists a u ∈ U such that u ⊩ α. A formula
α is consequently said to be unsatisfiable if there does not exist a u ∈ U such
that u ⊩ α.
The notion of satisfaction can be used to define logical consequence:
Definition 2.4. Given two formulas α,β ∈ L, the relation α ⊧ β, read that
β is a logical consequence of α, holds if and only if for every u ∈ U such that
u ⊩ α, then u ⊩ β, or, equivalently, α ⊧ β if and only if α̂ ⊆ β̂.
Logical consequence then leads to the following definition of logical equiv-
alence:
Definition 2.5. Given two formulas α,β ∈ L, the relation α ≡ β holds if and
only if α ⊧ β and also β ⊧ α.
Logical consequence, and logical equivalence, are both meta-level con-
cepts: they are not defined as a part of L itself, but rather represent deduc-
tions that can be made about statements in the language.
The above semantic concepts can also be extended to sets of statements:
Definition 2.6. Let K be a finite set of propositional formulas. A given
valuation, u ∈ U , then satisfies K, u ⊩ K if and only if it is the case that for
every formula α ∈ K, it is the case that u ⊩ α.
Much like with a single formula, it is then said that u is a model of K.
Then, classical entailment can be defined as logical consequence from a set
of statements:
Definition 2.7. Given K a set of formulas, and a formula α, it is the case
that α is entailed by K, written K ⊧ α, if and only if for every u ∈ U such
that u ⊩ K, it is the case that u ⊩ α.
In natural language, K entails any α if every model of K is also a model
of α. Entailment is essentially a pattern of reasoning that defines what
formulas follow from a set of formulas. The semantics defines this model
of reasoning in an unambiguous way: the above definition states that some
8
formula follows from a set of formulas if it is true in every case where the
knowledge base is true. Note that another way of defining entailment is that
for any set of propositional formulas K and a given formula α, K ⊧ α if and
only if K̂ ⊆ α̂, that is if the set of models of K is contained in the models of α.
This inherently ties entailment to finding models of a formula, said to be the
satisfiability problem, which is NP-complete, however there are algorithms
that can efficiently produce an answer for many cases [5].
For an example, let P = {p, q}. Then the set of all valuations will be
U ∶= {pq, pq, pq, pq}. Recall that in each valuation p asserts that p is true,
and p asserts that p is false. Then, for example, in the valuation pq, p is
false, and q is true. Now, given a K = {p → q}, it should be noted that not
all valuations satisfy K. The valuation pq does not satisfy K because while
p is true, q is false, which contradicts our propositional statement p → q,
which requires q to be true whenever p is true. This leaves the remaining
valuations: pq,pq,pq as the set of valuations satisfying K. Therefore, the set
of valuations pq,pq,pq} are referred to as the models of K.
Logical consequence of a set of formulas also informs logical equivalence
of sets of formulas:
Definition 2.8. Given K1,K2 ⊆ L, the relation K1 ≡ K2 holds if and only if
for every u ∈ U such that u ⊩ K1, then u ⊩ K2 and for every v ∈ U such that
v ⊩ K2 then v ⊩ K1.
The above definition simply states that logically equivalent sets of formu-
las share the exact same models. It naturally follows that logically equivalent
sets of formulas entail the exact same formulas.
Entailment is a meta-level notion, exactly like logical consequence and
equivalence. The notion of ⊧ is not defined in L, instead it is the concept of
what can be inferred from formulas in L. A significant implication of this is
that while the above definition of entailment is a classical, Tarskian definition
of consequence [56, 67], it is not the only definition for entailment, as will
be elaborated on in later chapters. The above notion of entailment can be
used to define a consequence operator :
Definition 2.9. A consequence operator for L, Cn is a function such that:
Cn ∶ 2L ↦ 2L.
Consequence operators receive as input a set of formulas, and output
a set of formulas. The intuition is that a consequence operator represents
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some notion of consequence: from a set of formulas as input, another set of
output formulas is inferred. Consequence operators have a flexible definition
by design: they can be used to represent any type of reasoning. Using the
definition of entailment above, a corresponding consequence operator, Cn⊧
can be defined as follows: Cn⊧(K) = {α ∣ K ⊧ α}, and likewise the reverse can
be formalized: K ⊧ α if and only if α ∈ Cn⊧(K).
Generally, when discussing sets of formulas, the term used is knowledge
base:
Definition 2.10. A knowledge base, K ⊆ L, is a finite set of propositional
formulas.
A knowledge base is intended to represent a set of facts about the world,
or some domain. For example, the knowledge base K = {p, p→ q} states that
there are two known facts: that p and p → q both hold. What exactly p
and q are is unimportant. Rather, each formula in a knowledge base can be
thought of as restricting the set of valuations in U that satisfy the knowledge
base. Above, the notions of entailment and satisfaction that applied to some
set of formulas K, naturally all apply in general to any knowledge base.
It is possible that for every u ∈ U that u /⊩ K, or that there is no model
of K. In this case, the knowledge base is unsatisfiable, and generally implies
that a contradiction that is logically equivalent to α ∧ ¬α is derivable from
the knowledge base. If this is the case, then the set of valuations satisfying
K is the empty set, ∅, and therefore for every formula α ∈ L, it is the case
that K̂ ⊆ α̂. Therefore, any unsatisfiable knowledge base entails the entire
language. This result is known more generally as the axiom of explosion, and
can be formalized as follows:
Corollary 2.0.1. Given a knowledge base K, if for all u ∈ U it is the case
that u /⊩ K then it is the case that K ⊧ α for any α ∈ L.
Defining the semantics with respect to a knowledge base allows for satis-
fiability checking, but reasoning is broader than that. A query is any propo-
sitional formula, and query checking is the process of determining if a par-
ticular formula is entailed by a knowledge base. This is no more difficult a
task to satisfiability checking, as query checking is analogous to checking if
the knowledge base is unsatisfiable when the negation of a formula is added
to the knowledge base.
Lemma 2.0.1. Given a knowledge base K, and a query α ∈ L, the relation
K ⊧ α holds if and only if K ∪ {¬α} ⊧ , i.e., if K ∪ {¬α} is unsatisfiable.
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With that in mind, extending the previous example, let the set of propo-
sitional atoms of our logic be P ∶= {p, q, r} and let the knowledge base
K ∶= {p→ q}. Now, consider the following query: p∧r → q. The set of all val-
uations of P is the following set U = {pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr}.
Then, the set of valuations satisfying K is K̂ = {pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr,pqr},
and the set of valuations satisfying the query statement p ∧ r → q is {pqr,
pqr, pqr, pqr, pqr, pqr, pqr}. If K̂ ⊆ α̂ then K ⊧ α, and in this case K̂ ⊆ α̂
is true, and therefore it is true that K ⊧ p ∧ r → q.
2.3 Deductive Systems
As a complement to the semantic definition of entailment, another method-
ology to draw inferences from a knowledge base is that of deductive systems
[5]. Generally speaking, deductive systems are defined with respect to a se-
mantics. Whereas semantics declaratively define the notion of truth in a
logic, and therefore logical consequence, deductive systems allow for a math-
ematical, or algorithmic, definition of logical consequence. The core idea is
to define what it means for an inference to follow from explicit knowledge
by defining rules that govern the pattern of reasoning. There are a number
of practical reasons to define deductive systems: if the explicit information
is very large then it is computationally expensive, if possible, to compute
the inferences purely semantically, whereas a deductive system would allow
for inferences to be derived relatively cheaply. Another motivation is that
intermediate results, lemmas, are lost in a purely semantic system, as the
only output is either true or false, while a deductive system shows each step
of reasoning from explicit to implicit information.
A core question of defining such a syntactic formulation of reasoning is,
naturally, how to define logical consequence syntactically. The answer is the
formalism of rules of inference [69]:
Definition 2.11. A rule of inference, r ∶= {Q, c}, is a set of formulas, Q =
{q1, ...qn}, called the premises and a formula, c, called the conclusion. A
given rule of inference, r, will have the following syntax: r = q1,...,qnc .
Rules of inference are syllogistic in nature, and represent a basic pattern of
deduction: given that the premises are true, then the conclusion is derivable.
A rule of inference is sound with respect to a logic, if it corresponds to the
existing notions of logical consequence.
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Definition 2.12. A rule of inference
q1,...,qn
c is sound if and only if q1, ..., qn⊧ c.
The other component of deductive systems are axiom schemas:
Definition 2.13. An axiom schema is a meta formula comprised of meta
variables, representing all formulas in the language of the same structure.
The exact structure of an axiom schema is dependent on the deductive
system itself. Axiom schemas may be purely an object-level statement, or a
meta-level one.
Having defined rules of inference and axiom schemas, deductive systems
can then be defined [5, 69]:
Definition 2.14. A deductive system for propositional logic is D ∶= ⟨LA, R⟩,
with LA a set of axiom schemas, and R a set of rules of inference.
Deductive systems either tend to have many rules and few axioms, or vice
versa. For example, Gentzen systems have one type of axiom schema, and
many rules of inference, whereas Hilbert systems have one rule of inference
and several axiom schema [5].
In addition to axiom schema, there are what are referred to as specific
axioms [69]. Specific axioms are the formulas in a knowledge base K. The
knowledge base K, along with the axiom schema, and rules of inference are
used to define proofs:
Definition 2.15. Given a deductive system D, and a set of specific axioms
K, a proof in D is a sequence of formulas S = {α1, ..., αn} where every formula
αi is either an instance of an axiom schema or a formula α ∈ K, or is derived
from some subset of the previous formulas α1, ..., αj, where 1 ≤ j < i, using a
rule of inference. The last formula, αn, of a proof is referred to as provable
in D from K, denoted K ⊢D αn.
The last formula of a proof may be used as an axiom in some subsequent
proof from K using the same deductive system.
A natural question is how to verify whether a deductive system accurately
models the kind of reasoning defined by the semantics in the previous section.
Recall that a rule of inference is sound with respect to a semantics if it
corresponds to the notion of logical consequence in such a semantics. This
can be extended to the whole deductive system. That is, a deductive system,
12
D, is sound with respect to a semantics if every formula true in D is also
true in the semantics, and complete if every formula true in the semantics is
true in D. If soundness and completeness are proven for D, then D exactly
represents the reasoning pattern defined by the semantics of a given logic.
2.3.1 Hilbert System
The first deductive system chosen to be described here is the Hilbert Sys-
tem, H [5]. Hilbert systems exist for many logics, naturally here it will be
described with reference to propositional logic.
First, some definitions to clarify axiom schemas in the context of this
Hilbert system:
Definition 2.16. An axiom schema for system H is a meta formula α such
that α may be replaced by any formula β ∈ L of the same form.
The notion of β being of the same form as α is essentially that β has the
same structure as α. For an example, an axiom schema could be β → α, such
that β and α are then meta formulas, and can be replaced by any γ → δ ∈ L.
As mentioned, Hilbert systems have many axiom schemas and a single
rule of inference. For propositional logic, they are as follows:
Definition 2.17. The Hilbert system H logical axiom schemas are:
1. α → (β → α)
2. (α → (β → γ))→ ((α → β)→ (α → γ))
3. (¬β → ¬α)→ (α → β)
along with the following rule of inference, modus ponens (MP):
α, α→β
β
For any knowledge base K, if a formula α ∈ L has a proof from K in H
then it is denoted K ⊢H α.
The Hilbert system only has one rule of inference in its definition, modus
ponens, but there are a number of rules of inference that may be derived. An
example is the deduction rule [5]:
Theorem 2.1. The deduction rule,
K∪{α}⊢β
K⊢α→β , is a sound derived rule in
system H for propositional logic.
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There are many such derivable rules in H, built upon previously derived
rules. However, the axiom schemas and modus ponens is all that is needed
for the definition.
Hilbert systems for propositional logic are sound and complete with re-
spect to the semantics for propositional logic:
Theorem 2.2 (Soundness and completeness). Given a knowledge base K
and any α ∈ L, the relation K ⊢H α holds if and only if K ⊧ α.
The proofs for soundness and completeness for a Hilbert system for propo-
sitional logic are well established in the literature [5, 69].
To illustrate the pattern of a formal proof, the formula ¬α → (α → β)
will be shown to be a tautology, i.e., derivable from the given logical axioms
and rules with no specific axioms:
1. ⊢ ¬α → (¬β → ¬α) Axiom 1
2. ¬α ⊢ ¬β → ¬α Deduction rule
3. ⊢ (¬β → ¬α)→ (α → β) Axiom 3
4. ¬α ⊢ α → β MP 2,3
5. ⊢ ¬α → (α → β) Deduction rule
Proofs using any deductive system follow the above pattern. Note that every
line is either an axiom, specific or logical, or an application of a rule of
inference to a subset of previous lines.
2.3.2 Gentzen System
The other deductive system presented here is a Gentzen system for proposi-
tional logic. As before, first the axiom schemas in this system are defined as
follows:
Definition 2.18. An axiom schema for the Gentzen system is a statement
α ⊢ β where α and β are meta-formulas that may be replaced by any γ, δ ∈ L
of the same form as α and β.
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A meta formula α may be replaced by a formula γ ∈ L of the same form
in the same way as before: provided the structure of γ is identical to the
structure of α.
Similarly, the definition given above for rules of inference needs to be
refined for Gentzen systems:
Definition 2.19. Given Γ,∆,Φ,Ψ ⊆ L as sets of formulas, then a rule of
inference for the Gentzen system takes the form:
Γ⊢∆
Φ⊢Ψ .
The difference to note is that the rules of inference, as well as the axiom
schema, in Gentzen systems use meta statements: statements containing
the meta symbol ⊢, used to denote logical consequence, rather than being
restricted purely to the object-level. The basic concept is identical however:
given that it is the case that Γ ⊢∆ then Φ ⊢ Ψ is derivable.
In contrast to Hilbert systems, Gentzen systems have many rules of in-
ference, and one axiom schema. The following is a formal definition of a
Gentzen system for propositional logic [4].
Definition 2.20. A Gentzen proof system for propositional logic consists of
the axiom schema:
α ⊢ α
and the following rules of inference, where K,∆ ⊆ L are sets of formulas, and


























For any knowledge base K, if α has a proof from K then it is denoted K ⊢G α.
The above Gentzen system is sound and complete with respect to the
semantics of propositional logic [35]:
Theorem 2.3 (Soundness and completeness). Given a knowledge base K
and a formula α ∈ L, then K ⊢G α if and only if K ⊧ α.
For an example of a proof using a Gentzen system, consider the following
proof of the tautology ⊢ (p ∧ q) → (q ∧ p). Note that for any α,β ∈ L, then
α,β is a syntactic shorthand for {α} ∪ {β}:
1. p, q ⊢ p, q Axiom
2. ⊢ ¬p,¬q, q, p Right negation
3. ⊢ ¬(p ∧ q), q, p Right disjunction
4. ⊢ ¬(p ∧ q), (q ∧ p) Right disjunction
5. p ∧ q ⊢ q ∧ p Left negation
6. ⊢ (p ∧ q)→ (q ∧ p) Right implication
2.4 Consequence Relations
A more abstract notion of defining logical consequence, consequence relations
are structures defining a pattern of reasoning over a given language. Rather
than working directly on a given knowledge base, as in semantics, or in de-
ductive systems where they were referred to as specific axioms, consequence
relations define logical consequence as a mathematical relation between for-
mulas, such that the relation conforms to some set of properties constraining
what pattern of reasoning is represented by the relation.
Formally, a consequence relation is a, possibly infinite, set of ordered
pairs: {(α1, β1), ..., (αn, βn), ...} with each αi, βi ∈ L. Generally, it is ac-
cepted that each ordered pair may contain a set of formulas as the antecedent,
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that is αi, and a single formula as the consequent, βi. Here, the consequence
relations that will be considered are those where the antecedent, αi, is a sin-
gle formula. Consequence relations are often denoted as a binary relation,
⊢, such that α ⊢ β is interpreted that (α, β) is in the set and α /⊢ β is inter-
preted that it is not. The intuition meant to be represented by a consequence
relation is that each ordered pair represents an inference. If (α, β) is in the
consequence relation, the meaning attached is that β can be inferred from α,
and this meaning should then also be attached to the binary relation, with
α ⊢ β meaning that β can be inferred from α.
It should be clear that not all such sets of ordered pairs represent a
meaningful notion of inference. It is simple to construct a random such set,
e.g. {(α, β), (γ, δ)} which represents no meaningful notion of consequence
in isolation, regardless of the interpretation of the formulas. Avron [3]
described two main properties that a consequence relation should satisfy to
represent a reasonable notion of inference:
1. Reflexivity: α ⊢ α for every α ∈ L
2. Cut: if α ⊢ β ∧ γ and γ ∧ δ ⊢ η then α ∧ δ ⊢ β ∧ η
Reflexivity is relatively straightforward, but Cut may be harder to decipher
at first glance. In essence, Cut is a form of logical transitivity, and is the
same reasoning as using a lemma for a theorem: anything that can be derived
in the current theory, can be used to derive more inferences. Using the above
expression for Cut, if α expresses the current information available, and γ is
a direct consequence, then observe how since η is a consequence of γ in the
presence of δ, then to derive η from α, all that is needed is δ.
While the above two properties are viewed as basic properties a mean-
ingful consequence relation should satisfy, they can both be extended by
specifying additional properties, or be discarded, if the form of reasoning de-
sired is not modelled well using those properties. A consequence relation not
satisfying reflexivity, for example, may express some form of reasoning about
trust, including rejecting information given to the agent by an untrustworthy
source [3].
In this way, properties essentially constrain the set of consequence rela-
tions of interest, by first assuming the set of all consequence relations to be
of interest, and then eliminating those relations not satisfying the desired
properties.
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2.5 Properties of Classical Deduction
In the context of this dissertation, it is appropriate to discuss a set of prop-
erties satisfied by Tarskian notions of entailment. In the previous section,
classical entailment, ⊧, was defined semantically. However, the properties
classical entailment satisfies can be enumerated in much the same fashion as
consequence relations in the previous section. Let K be a knowledge base, and
recall that Cn was defined as a consequence operator on any set of formulas,
producing a set of formulas that is inferred, via some notion of consequence,
from the set of formulas given as input.
Tarski [67, 56] defined a set of properties that any notion of logical
consequence should satisfy:
1. Inclusion: K ⊆ Cn(K)
2. Monotonicity: if K ⊆ K′ then Cn(K) ⊆ Cn(K′)
3. Idempotence: Cn(K) = Cn(Cn(K))
Any consequence operation satisfying the above properties is referred to as
a Tarskian operation.
Inclusion is reasonably self-evident, a knowledge base entails at least the
stated explicit information. Idempotence states that classical entailment pro-
duces a set of formulas that is closed under the consequence operation. In
this context, closure states that for some notion of consequence ⊧, a closed
set Γ contains every formula α such that Γ ⊧ α. Idempotence therefore en-
sures that every formula that is a logical consequence of the knowledge base
is in the resultant set, and describes a form of reasoning that is omniscient,
always producing every possible inference in a single operation.
Monotonicity states that adding any explicit information to a knowledge
base should never remove an inference entailed by the knowledge base with-
out said information. At first, monotonicity might seem to make perfect
sense as a characteristic of reasoning, as adding information should not re-
sult in retracting statements if the reasoning process is perfectly sound. For
example, consider the knowledge base:
• man → mortal
• Socrates → man
• plucked chicken → featherless biped
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Then it is reasonable, just from the first two statements, to conclude that
Socrates is mortal. The third statement, while part of the same knowledge
base, is irrelevant to our conclusion, and therefore monotonicity ensures that
this conclusion is not retracted given new information.
From a semantic perspective, monotonicity essentially states that only
those inferences with the maximum support in the knowledge base should be
drawn. Recall that for some knowledge base K and a formula α ∈ L, then
K ⊧ α if and only if α holds in every valuation satisfying K. Monotonicity
ensures that if there is a single world where K is true, and α is not, then
K /⊧ α. Tarskian consequence therefore insists that every inference must have
iron-clad proof of its veracity.
However, monotonicity does not always appear to be an accurate model
for how humans reason in real life. Humans frequently make assumptions
that supplement their current knowledge, and it is not the case that ad-
ditional information never changes one’s conclusions; it is rather entirely
dependent on whether the new information is a) relevant to the conclusion,
and b) convincing enough to change one’s mind. Monotonicity, however, is
completely indifferent to such a nuance. Rather, any such nuance should be
handled explicitly in the knowledge base.
Considering again our knowledge base on Socrates, suppose we had:
• man → mortal
• Socrates → man
• Socrates → ¬ mortal
Now we may not want to draw our previous conclusion that Socrates is
mortal, in the presence of additional information that directly states his
immortality. Examining the valuations for this knowledge base, there are
three that are models:
{man mortal Socrates, man mortal Socrates, man mortal Socrates}
In other words, as far as classical entailment is concerned, Socrates does
not exist, as there is no model of the knowledge base such that Socrates
is true. For Socrates to be able to exist, the knowledge base could be
changed such that in place of man → mortal, instead the statement man
∧¬ Socrates → mortal could be added. This would mean the valuation
man mortal Socrates would be a model of the knowledge base, and there-
fore there is a world where Socrates exists.
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The moral of the above example is that in a monotonic logic, the con-
cept of something typically being the case cannot be directly modelled in the
language, and the overall intended meaning can be challenging to model. As
exceptions have to be explicitly handled in the knowledge base, any domain
rich in exceptions, such as flightless birds, will result in unreasonably large
formulas, especially as the amount of information to be modelled gets larger
and larger. Consider a possible knowledge base about birds containing a
formula to the effect of: bird∧¬penguin∧¬ostrich∧¬kiwi∧¬...→ flies.
However, “birds typically fly” is a reasonable statement that accurately ex-
presses reality, as realistically, flight is heavily associated with birds, and the
majority of them do indeed fly. Any logic-based system cataloguing birds
should likely consider it reasonable to conclude that a random bird does fly
in the absence of knowledge to the contrary. Here, the proposed solution to
this particular problem is that of nonmonotonic logics.
2.6 Object and Meta Levels
Lastly, before leaving classical logics behind, the notion of the object-level of a
language, and the meta-level should be made explicit. In propositional logic,
the object-level is any part of the language that is used to model knowledge,
i.e., the propositional formulas themselves that make up the language L.
The meta-level, on the other hand, is anything that operates over the object-
level. Entailment, as mentioned previously, is a meta-level concept, as it is
an operation that defines what can be inferred from the object-level. The
intuition is that the object-level represents knowledge, and the meta-level is
knowledge about that knowledge.
This distinction can be made more obvious by considering the concepts
and symbols defined so far. Recall when L was defined. The connectives
used to make up the formulas in L, that is ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, ⊺,  along with
the propositional atoms, are all object-level connectives. On the other hand,
entailment was defined with the ⊧ symbol, and a knowledge base was de-
noted as K. Both of these symbols are meta-level symbols, that are used to
represent what can be said about the object-level statements.
This distinction is not trivial. It is easy to mix up object-level and meta-
level concepts, and doing so can result in errors can prove difficult to diagnose.
Consider the binary relation for consequence relations, ⊢, which represents
the notion that a formula is a logical consequence of another formula, or
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a set of formulas. This is, inherently, a meta-level notion of consequence,
α ⊢ β is not a statement in the language, rather it is a statement about the
language, and often is conditional on what form of reasoning ⊢ is meant to
represent. Contrast this with →, which is a connective in L, and therefore is
an object-level operation. However, even though → is associated with a type
of notion of consequence, it is fixed, with a truth table defining its meaning in
all cases. α → β states that β must be true in any valuation where α is true,
and therefore → asserts that this consequence is the case, and has to hold in
any meaningful interpretation of the object-level knowledge. Confusing α ⊢ β
for an object-level statement is an easy mistake to make, and can result in
adding a meta-level inference to explicit object-level knowledge. Whether or
not α ⊢ β is true or not is completely dependent on the meaning attached to
⊢, and cannot be asserted in all cases, in contrast to the object-level. This
is the case for any meta-level symbol, such as ⊧, ≡, ⊩, and ⊢.
The distinction between object-level and meta-level notions will become
a significant issue in later chapters. Defeasible consequence will be defined
on the meta-level, and then the same symbol will be redefined to be an
object-level connective. This will be made explicit, however the shift from
meta-level to object-level should be noted, as the intended meaning behind





In the previous chapter, the limitations to expressing exceptional knowledge
using classical logics was discussed. It then raises the question, what is the
best way to alter existing logics so as to accurately and efficiently model
information containing exceptions? A number of competing formalisms have
been defined, some of which have been shown to be identical in expressivity,
from different perspectives. This chapter will briefly describe a number of
these frameworks, before motivating the choice of the framework that the
rest of this dissertation will be focused on.
For a discussion on the uses of nonmonotonic reasoning, section 3 from
McCarthy [53] enumerates a number of problems and applications for non-
monotonic logics.
3.1 Belief Revision
One popular approach to reasoning about belief change, a problem that corre-
sponds to the core of nonmonotonic reasoning, is belief revision, first defined
by Alchourron, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1, 2]. Belief revision
models an agent’s set of beliefs about the world by encoding them as a set
of statements in a logic, referred to as a belief set, and defines operations
that model the agent adjusting the belief set to conform to new information.
The two main operations to achieve this are revision and contraction. The
revision operator models being told that a given statement, often not in the
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belief set, is true, and modifies the belief set such that it incorporates the new
statement in a satisfiable way. Contraction is the inverse operation, where a
statement is provided with the information that it is not entailed from the
knowledge base, and the belief set is modified such that the statement is no
longer entailed.
AGM belief revision operators conform to a number of postulates, de-
scribing the properties the operators should satisfy. These postulates are not
without controversy, as there are extensions to belief revision that revolve
around changing the postulates to model different forms of reasoning. Dar-
wiche and Pearl [30] proposed an extension to handle conditional beliefs,
statements subject to retraction, by changing the AGM postulates to allow
for iterated belief change, meaning the changes to a knowledge base are stored
after an operation, which is not the case in AGM style belief revision. Booth
[8, 9] has worked on a number of extensions to belief revision, including iter-
ated belief revision, as well as non-prioritised belief revision. Non-prioritised
belief revision, also referred to as trust-sensitive belief revision [10, 44], is
another extension that does not always accept new information, whereas in
AGM belief revision, new information is prioritised over existing information.
There have also been developments in merging belief revision with nonmono-
tonic logics by Casini and Meyer [24], which integrates the belief change
operators into a preferential framework, by defining the AGM postulates in
a preferential logic.
3.2 Circumscription
Circumscription [52] [53] is another framework for nonmonotonic reasoning.
First described in 1980, it was proposed as an extension to first-order logic
to address the problem of encoding a form of “common sense” reasoning
in existing formal structures. For example, a boat is assumed to work as
intended, unless there is something preventing its use, and therefore is an
atypical boat. Circumscription treats each predicate, or concept, as able
to be normal or abnormal. This allows a fluid formalism that can reason
elegantly about poorly defined concepts such as “besides x there is something
else atypical about y”.
The mechanism used to represent such ideas is a meta-level axiom over
a regular, monotonic language that circumscribes a formula in the language
such that an instance of a formula can be explicitly abnormal with respect to
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some characteristic, which allows for easy modelling of nested abnormalities.
Using circumscription, it is relatively straightforward to represent in a single
knowledge base, for example, “normal animals, defined as not being abnor-
mal in a particular way, do not fly”, and also “birds normally fly, unless it
is abnormal in a different way than previously defined”. This allows circum-
scription to be quite expressive, allowing for numerous levels of defeasible
reasoning. However, this generally means that to get meaningful results,
one has to pick which predicates may or may not be atypical, which puts a
higher burden on the modelling process to accurately capture the intended
meaning. Since circumscription considers atypicality for every predicate, the
computational costs of implementing circumscription increase exponentially
with the size of the knowledge base. Cadoli and Lenzerini [23] showed an
algorithm for computing circumscription in the propositional case that takes
exponential time in the worst case, and polynomial time in the best case.
3.3 Default Logic
Reiter’s default logic is a nonmonotonic framework that has proven influen-
tial in the field [48, 36, 31]. Default logic represents information as defaults
with the intended meaning of “most x’s are y’s”, or “typically a’s are b’s”.
First described by Reiter [61], and then revised by Reiter and Criscuolo [62].
It was originally devised to enrich first-order logic, by adding the notion that
there are default states, assumptions that can be drawn as inferences in the
absence of information to the contrary, as a solution to the same core problem
of nonmonotonic reasoning: how to most effectively model information con-
taining exceptions. Default logic does so by choosing to address a problem
arising from modelling around the exceptions: the problem of inheritance
for non-exceptional subclasses. If one models birds, and chooses to explicitly
handle exceptions by stating “birds that are neither penguins nor ostriches
fly”, then upon learning that tweety is a bird, but it is not clear which bird,
classical entailment will not infer that tweety can fly. Reiter’s solution was to
therefore add the notion that, by default, it should be assumed that generic
birds should fly. A default theory, analogous to a knowledge base for default
logic, is a pair ⟨W, D⟩ where W is a set of ordinary formulas in the language,




This rule can be read as “if x is an α, and it is consistent with all knowledge
so far that x is also β1...βn, then conclude that x is also a γ. Consistency
in this context is taken to mean that the negation is not derivable using
classical entailment. That is, a formula β is consistent with a default theory
∆ if ∆ /⊧ ¬β. Default logic then defines extensions to a default theory.
Extensions of a default theory are expected to satisfy certain properties:
they must contain W , it must be closed under classical deduction, and it
should satisfy every default rule in D. Such extensions can be thought of as
satisfying different patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning, and can be used to
find defeasible inferences of a given default theory.
Reiter defined default logic proof-theoretically, but did not have a cor-
responding semantics. The lack of a model theory means that it can be
difficult to choose between different extensions, having to instead rely on
intuition about what kind of reasoning is suitable for a given domain [64].
However, Delgrande et al. [31] defined a semantics for default logic, along
with a number of extensions. In section 5.5.1 it will be shown that the gen-
eral patterns of default reasoning can be formalized semantically using the
KLM framework [48].
3.4 Propositional Typicality Logic
In Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) [11], defeasibility is encoded by a
unary operator ● that is placed before a formula in any part of a propositional
formula. A propositional formula α → β can be defeasibly expressed as either
●α → β which semantically means that typical αs imply β, as α → ●β which
reads that α implies typical βs, ●α → ●β meaning that typical αs imply typical
βs, or even as ●(α → β), meaning that typically, α implies β. The ● operator
can, as was just shown, be placed before any formula in the language: the
language of PTL can therefore be defined as every formula α ∈ L, along with
●α for every α ∈ L. The flexibility of this typicality operator allows for a
variety of representations of defeasible knowledge.
The semantics of PTL is preferential, meaning that preference relations
are defined over valuations, such that there are valuations that are minimal
with respect to the relation. Therefore, there are no preferred valuations,
and the ● operator is understood to mean that only those minimal valuations
that are models of the formula are to be considered to prove the truth of the
statement.
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The typicality operator is strong enough that PTL can embed propo-
sitional AGM belief revision [11]. Both belief revision and PTL have a
preferential semantics, and so revising a knowledge base with some formula
α in belief revision is semantically similar to the models of ●α in PTL.
3.5 Nonmonotonic Modal Logic
Modal logic is an extension of some logic, here propositional logic will be the
language to be extended, that adds two modal operators, usually denoted as
◻, and ◇. Modal operators are unary operations, that can be placed before
any formula in the language, that is for any α ∈ L, ◻α is a valid statement
in a modal logic. Given that the modal logic contains negation, ¬, then the
two operators are interdefinable: given a formula α, and the modal operators
◻ and ◇, then ◻α ≡ ¬ ◇ ¬α, and vice versa. Modal operators may also
be denoted L, K, or M dependent on the exact meaning ascribed to it in
the language in question. For example, in deontic logic, which is intended
to reason about duty and normativity, the modal operator ◻ carries the
interpretation of “it is obligatory” [68], whereas in epistemic logic it could
mean “it is known”, or “it is common knowledge” [40], and denoted K.
Using deontic logic as an example, if ◻ is taken to mean “it is obligatory”,
then using the above equality, ◇ is used as shorthand for “it is permitted”,
as it is defined as ¬◻¬α, for any α ∈ L, which is read as “it is not obligatory
to not α”.
In general, modal operators are intended to represent some mode of truth
regarding a statement in the language. Rather than examining the absolute
truth of a formula, as in propositional logic, modal logic examines the con-
ditions under which some statement is true. Therefore, when a formula is
combined with a modal operator, the truth value is not dependent purely
on the truth of the formula, but rather on whether the formula could be-
come true, or whether it is always true, with the interpretation of that truth
dependent on the specific modal logic in question.
McDermott and Doyle [54] and McDermott [55] proposed a nonmono-
tonic modal logic, where the modal operator, denoted in his work as M , is
read as “is consistent with the knowledge so far”. On the meta-level, new
rules for nonmonotonic inference are defined. Mp is the case in any theory K
(read: knowledge base) if K ⊢ ¬p is not provable. Naturally, this definition
leads to some apparent circular reasoning: what does provable mean? It also
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allows for spurious entailments, as pointed out by McDermott [55]. McDer-
mott [55] defines a modified semantics based on modal logic semantics: a
class of models referred to as noncommittal models. Noncommittal models
are a subset of all modal models, excluding those models that have undesir-
able, unfounded necessary statements of the form ¬Mα for some α, which
results in a set of models that “have as many things possible as possible”.
The resulting semantics is also accompanied by a proof system, for which
soundness and completeness have been proven [55].
However, this form of nonmonotonic modal logic has some theoretical
problems. The first formalization by McDermott and Doyle [54] is predicated
on Mα being the case if α is consistent, but McDermott [55] noted that,
as a result of the definition of consistency, Mα is not inconsistent with ¬α,
meaning that there exist knowledge bases in this framework for which it
is both the case that Mα and ¬α to be derivable, i.e., that it is both the
case that α is consistent and that it is false. The second formalization [55]
then based consistency on existing modal logic semantics, which resulted in
the subsequent nonmonotonic logic collapsing into regular, monotonic modal
logic. Moore [58] pointed out these flaws, and used it as a basis for defining
autoepistemic logic.
3.6 Autoepistemic Logic
Autoepistemic logic was first defined by Moore [58, 57], building upon the
ideas of nonmonotonic modal logic [54, 55]. Epistemic logic, in general, is
a family of modal logics that was devised to reason about knowing agents.
Correspondingly, autoepistemic logic is, conceptually, a logic representing an
agent that reflects on their own beliefs about the world, represented by a set
of formulas referred to as an autoepistemic theory. The modal operator, L,
then has the interpretation of “it is believed”. The modelling of an agent’s
beliefs necessarily has to allow for nonmonotonic inferences, as it has to
account for an agent’s beliefs and knowledge change, which may well result
in retractions of conclusions. Autoepistemic logic is defined via a model
theory: initially, the semantics of which are propositional semantics with an
additional layer of an autoepistemic interpretation, which is a propositional
model where Lα is true if and only if α is true in the autoepistemic theory.
Moore [57] defined an alternative model theory for autoepistemic logic more
in line with traditional modal logic semantics.
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Konolige [45] showed that autoepistemic logic and default logic have an
equivalence, that is every default logic theory can be expressed in autoepis-
temic logic, and vice versa, every statement possible in autoepistemic logic
can be expressed as a default theory. One significant implication of this re-
sult is that autoepistemic semantics could be ported to default logic, which
was defined as a proof-theoretic system, with no model theory.
3.7 Preferential Approach
The approach to nonmonotonic reasoning explored in this dissertation is that
of the preferential approach, which was first defined by Shoham [64, 65].
Shoham defined the class of preferential logics, achieved by enriching regular
semantics with a preference relation over all valuations. Then, for a formula
α to be satisfiable, it must be satisfied by all the most preferred models of
α. This set of most preferred models is defined as being all models of α that
are minimal with respect to the preference relation. Using the preferential
semantics, notions of preferential entailment can be defined by specifying
that {α} ∣≈ β, read as “α preferentially entails β”, if and only if all preferred
models of α also satisfy β. A foundation for a corresponding proof-theoretic
system for preferential reasoning was also defined by Gabbay [34]. Both
the semantics and corresponding proof system were then extended by Kraus
et al. [46], to form what will be referred to as the KLM framework. This
exact framework will be described, along with extensions, in the next two
chapters.
The main reasons for choosing the KLM framework are the following:
it has both a model theory, based on the preferential semantics just men-
tioned, a proof theory based on that of Gabbay’s that also functions as an
extendable set of postulates, analogous to that of belief revision’s, and it also
defines reasoning algorithms that are computationally well behaved and no




So far, it has been shown that classical monotonic logics lack the expressivity
to explicitly represent exceptions, without challenging alterations to the for-
mulas in the knowledge base. However, this raises the question of what such
a nonmonotonic logic looks like, and how it should behave. Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor, who will be referred to from here as KLM [46] argued that a
nonmonotonic logic should be able to explicitly state “an x is typically a y”,
in which they define “typically” to be read as “in the normal case, it is rea-
sonable to conclude y, given x”. Classical logic cannot syntactically convey
such a reading, and so KLM [46] and Lehmann and Magidor [49] define an
extension to propositional logic to capture it. Initially, KLM defined a pref-
erential consequence relation over a propositional logic. In other words, they
first describe what it means to reason in a nonmonotonic fashion over the
regular propositional language. Later, this will be extended to incorporating
nonmonotonic notions on the object-level.
This chapter will describe a fundamental type of reasoning in the KLM
framework, preferential reasoning. Preferential reasoning is described as the
core of nonmonotonic reasoning [26], for reasons that should become clear,
but partly because it lays down the semantic foundations that are shared
by many nonmonotonic logics. First, preferential consequence relations will
be described, along with the semantics associated with them, before defining
preferential entailment and preferential logic.
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4.1 Preferential Consequence Relations
KLM [46] first defined a meta-level consequence relation on a propositional
language. Initially, this was formalized in a series of logics defined by differ-
ent notions of consequence, each satisfying a more inclusive set of properties.
The particular system of interest here was denoted P, for preferential reason-
ing, and will be what is described in this section. A preferential consequence
relation is denoted by ∣∼, to be contrasted with ⊢, and is a set of defeasible
implications, also referred to in the literature as conditional assertions, writ-
ten as α ∣∼ β with α,β ∈ L, with the intended reading that “from α, I am
willing to jump to conclude β unless I have information to the contrary”. In
this context, “defeasible” could be read as meaning “retractable”, that is any
defeasible statement is one that may be withdrawn upon learning contradic-
tory information. As in the classical case, when ∣∼ represents a consequence
relation, then α ∣∼ β means that the pair (α, β) is in the consequence relation
and α /∣∼ β means that it is not in the relation.
Preferential consequence relations are defined by a set of properties, rep-
resented as a set of rules of inference, which should be read as: from the
presence of the statements above, the statements below can be derived. In
the context of a consequence relation, however, these rules should be inter-
preted as: if the statements above are in the relation, then the statements
below must also be in the relation. The following definition presents these
rules:
Definition 4.1. The consequence relation defined by ∣∼ is a preferential con-
sequence relation if and only if it satisfies the following properties, referred
to from now as the KLM postulates:
1. (LLE) Left logical equivalence:
⊺⊧α↔β, α∣∼γ
β∣∼γ
2. (RW) Right weakening:
⊺⊧α→β, γ∣∼α
γ∣∼β








6. (CM) Cautious Monotonicity:
α∣∼γ, α∣∼β
α∧β∣∼γ
The above set of properties essentially acts as a set of constraints on all
consequence relations. Recall that consequence relations are sets of ordered
pairs of the form {(α,β), (γ, δ), ...} with α,β, γ, δ ∈ L. The above definition
states that only those consequence relations, ∣∼, satisfying all of the above
KLM postulates may be referred to as a preferential consequence relation.
A consequence relation satisfies one of these given properties if, given the
presence of pairs satisfying the statements above, then there must be a pair,
or pairs, satisfying the statements below. For example, reflexivity requires
that a preferential consequence relation must have, for every α ∈ L, the pair
(α,α).
Each postulate corresponds to a pattern of reasoning about defeasible
information. Left logical equivalence states that if α and β are classically
equivalent, and γ is typically derivable from one of them, then it should
be typically derivable from either of them. This rule should be intuitively
verifiable, but enforces the influence of the underlying logic on the preferential
consequence relation.
Right weakening, as with LLE, enforces the influence of the underlying
classical logic on the preferential consequence relation. RW states that any
classical consequences derivable from a defeasible consequence, can them-
selves be defeasibly concluded from the initial premises. RW essentially
states that defeasible consequences are closed under logical consequences
[49].
Reflexivity is satisfied by almost all types of reasoning, and is an axiom of
classical consequence relations. Simply, reflexivity requires any preferential
consequence relation to enforce all formulas to be defeasible consequences of
themselves.
And expresses that the conjunction of two defeasible consequences is itself
a defeasible consequence. Consider the statements, isomorphic or identical
to the intuitions given by KLM [46]: “If it rains, then usually the streets get
wet” and “If it rains, then usually the plants are watered”. Then, it should
be reasonable to be able to derive “If it rains, then usually the streets get
wet, and usually the plants are watered”.
Or expresses that if a formula can be defeasibly concluded from two differ-
ent formulas, then it should be a defeasible conclusion from the disjunction of
those formulas. Paraphrasing the example given by KLM [46]: consider that
if it is known that “If Andy attends the party, then normally the evening will
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be great”, and that “If Jessie attends the party, then normally the evening
will be great”, then if it is known that “Andy or Jessie will attend the party”,
that it should be reasonable to conclude that attending is a good idea.
Finally, cautious monotonicity essentially states that upon learning new
information, if that information could have been inferred before learning it,
then it should never invalidate any conclusion previously derived. If it is
known that “it is raining”, and it can be inferred that “the roads are wet”,
and it can also be inferred that “plants are watered”, then neither inference
should have any bearing on the other, as they are derivable from the same
knowledge. Cautious monotonicity is a central property of preferential con-
sequence, as it replaces the property of monotonicity previously described
as a central property for classical reasoning. Whereas monotonicity states
that adding premises does not affect prior conclusions, cautious monotonic-
ity rather states that only premises that are themselves conclusions from the
same knowledge are irrelevant to prior conclusions. Therefore, there is room
left for premises, that are not already able to be inferred and therefore rep-
resents new knowledge, to cause prior conclusions to be withdrawn, and so
defeasibility is introduced.
Some other properties of interest that are derivable from the KLM pos-










Cut is used in monotonic logics, compare the cut rule for classical conse-
quence relations defined previously. Note, however, that in the form pre-
sented here it does not imply monotonicity, whereas the usual form of cut
does.
S is another derived rule, specifically, it is implied by reflexivity, right
weakening, left logical equivalence, and Or. It essentially states that the
conjunction of two formulas defeasibly implying a third implies that one of
the conjuncts defeasibly implies a material link between the other conjunct
and the conclusion.
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The last derived rule of interest, D, is a formalism of proof by cases, also
known as proof by exhaustion. It states that if a defeasible consequence holds
in complementary cases, then it should hold in isolation.
Two properties of interest not satisfied by preferential consequence rela-








Transitivity and contraposition may seem like intuitive properties for ∣∼ to
satisfy. In the case of transitivity, it necessarily implies monotonicity because
the nature of defeasible information is that such inheritance chains can be
broken. The nature of nonmonotonicity is that if a penguin is typically a
bird and birds typically fly, then it is not necessarily the case that penguins
typically fly. With respect to transitivity’s representation above: what if α is
an atypical example of β, and it is explicitly known that α /∣∼ γ? Transitivity
therefore cannot hold, as it is antithetical to defeasible reasoning patterns.
Contraposition also violates the nature of nonmonotonicity: continuing the
previous theme, if birds typically fly, then are things that do not fly typically
not birds? It is perhaps debatable, but the possibility of atypical, flightless
birds means that a conservative pattern of nonmonotonic reasoning will con-
clude not, and knowing that something is flightless is not enough information
to conclude that they are not a bird.
Preferential consequence relations form a mathematical basis for how pref-
erential reasoning should behave. However, to define what it means for a
defeasible inference to follow from a knowledge base, a semantics that cor-
responds to this form of reasoning needs to be defined. The next section
will define the preferential semantics that can be used to further study this
particular type of reasoning.
4.2 Preferential Interpretations
The semantics that KLM [46] and Lehmann and Magidor [49] provided
for ∣∼ is based on the preferential semantics defined previously by Shoham
[64, 65, 66]. A preferential semantics imposes an ordering over valuations
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such that if an agent prefers a valuation u to another valuation v, then the
agent will likely consider u before considering v. The notion of an agent
preferring one valuation over another can be interpreted in more than one
way. One intended meaning is that more typical valuations are preferred. A
valuation in which birds fly is preferred to one where they do not. It could
also be interpreted via a goal oriented lens, where an agent prefers those
valuations more aligned with an end goal.
Generally, in the context of defeasible reasoning, preferred worlds will
be those that are more normal, or typical, and those worlds that are more
improbable will not be considered, unless explicit information forces them to
be.
This preference ordering is achieved in preferential semantics by introduc-
ing a meta notion of states. Each state is mapped to a classical valuation.
States are necessarily distinct from valuations, as multiple states may map
to the same valuation, and therefore there may be infinitely many states in
a given interpretation. So, formally [46, 49]:
Definition 4.2. A preferential interpretation P is a triple ⟨S, l,≺⟩ with S
being a possibly infinite set of states, l:S ↦ U is a function mapping states
to valuations, and ≺ is a strict partial order on S.
For every α ∈ L and some P, let JαKP ∶= {s ∈ S,S ∈ P, l(s) ⊩ α}, in other
words, let JαKP be the set of all states in a given preferential interpretation
such that the valuation associated with each state satisfies α.
There are some technical properties of preferential interpretations that
should be discussed. First, minimality in P is defined as follows:
Definition 4.3. For any P = ⟨S, l,≺⟩, a state s ∈ S is minimal in P if and
only if there is no s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≺ s. The set of all such s in some P is
referred to as min≺(P) = {s ∣ there is no s′ such that s′ ≺ s}.
Now, two important properties of preferential interpretations are as fol-
lows:
Definition 4.4. P is well-founded if and only if ⟨S,≺⟩ is well-founded. ⟨S,≺⟩
is well-founded if and only if for any subset S′ ⊆ S there is a s ∈ S′ that is
minimal.
Along with well-foundedness, there is a related property of smoothness:
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Definition 4.5. The partial order ≺ for some P is smooth if and only if for
any formula α ∈ L, it is the case that JαKP has a minimal state s.
Any preferential interpretation will be said to be finite if and only if
the set of states S is finite. Note that smoothness is satisfied by any well-
founded preferential interpretation, as well as by any finite interpretation.
Well-foundedness essentially prevents an infinitely descending chain of states,
while smoothness is a weaker form of well-foundedness that only requires all
formulas to have a minimal state that satisfies it.
The significance of preferential interpretations is that each one defines a
preferential consequence relation [46]. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 4.6 (Soundness). Given a preferential interpretation P = ⟨S, l,≺⟩
and α,β ∈ L, then P defines a preferential consequence relation, ∣∼P , such
that: α ∣∼P β if and only if for any s minimal in JαKP , s ⊩ β.
The above soundness definition states that P defines a preferential con-
sequence relation, ∣∼P , and that α ∣∼P β if in every preferred state where α is
true, β is also true. This mechanism, only considering the preferred worlds,
essentially provides a conditional view on truth: ignore those scenarios that
are improbable in some respect, and focus on those ones that are typical to
evaluate whether some β typically follows from some α.
To illustrate how a preferential interpretation defines a preferential con-
sequence relation, given the propositional logic over the set of propositions
P ∶= {p, q, r}, then the following preferential interpretation, P, can be con-
structed, where each state is labelled by l(s), the valuation it maps to, rather
than the state itself, for readability, and preference is conveyed by a state




Then, by soundness, P defines a corresponding preferential consequence,
∣∼P , such that for some α,β ∈ L, if for every minimal state satisfying α, β
is also satisfied, then α ∣∼P β. Then, given the above P, note that for every
minimal state satisfying p, that r is also satisfied. The minimal states in





Therefore, p ∣∼P r. There are, of course, other consequences in P, such as
r ∣∼P ¬p, as the minimal r states, those that are labelled pqr and pqr, both
satisfy ¬p.
Using the soundness definition, the following lemma shows why duplicate
states, multiple states that map onto the same valuation, are important
for preferential interpretations, specifically for the following representation
theorem:
Lemma 4.0.1. There exists a preferential consequence relation such that
there does not exist a corresponding preferential interpretation without dupli-
cate states.
Proof : KLM [46] suggested the following preferential interpretation as
an example of such a preferential consequence relation, over the propositional
logic with the set of atoms P = {p, q}: P ∶= {S, l, ≺} with S = {s1, s2, s3, s4},
the labelling function: l(s1) = pq, l(s2) = pq, l(s3) = pq, l(s1) = pq, and the
preference ordering s3 ≺ s1 and s4 ≺ s2. P can be visualized as follows:
pq pq
pq pq
Then, since P is a preferential interpretation, it defines a preferential
consequence relation ∣∼P . The question is whether there exists a preferential
interpretation P ′ without duplicate states, such that ∣∼P ′ is equivalent to
∣∼P . So, P ′ ∶= {S′, l′, ≺′} such that S′ = {s′1, s′2, s′3} as there cannot be more
states than valuations, by design, and with the labelling function l such that
l(s′1) = pq, l(s′2) = pq, l(s′3) = pq. Then, the core factor is does there exist
a preference relation for these states such that every statement of the form
α ∣∼P β satisfied by P is also satisfied by P ′? Firstly, note that ⊺ ∣∼P ¬q
and therefore s′2 and s
′
3 have to be minimal in P ′. Then, it is also the case
that neither p ∣∼P q nor p ∣∼P ¬q, and so therefore s′1 must also be minimal
in P ′ since s′2 is minimal. But, if s′1 is minimal in P ′ then ⊺ /∣∼P ′ ¬q even
though ⊺ ∣∼P ¬q. So s′1 cannot be minimal in P ′, although it has already
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been established that it must be. This is a contradiction, and therefore P ′
is impossible to construct, and P defines a preferential consequence relation
that cannot be represented by a preferential interpretation without duplicate
states.
The following representation theorem solidifies the link between prefer-
ential interpretations and preferential consequence relations [46, 49]:
Theorem 4.1. ∣∼ defines a preferential consequence relation if and only if
it is the consequence relation defined by a preferential interpretation. In a
finite language, every preferential consequence relation is defined by a finite
preferential interpretation.
This representation theorem explicitly links preferential interpretations
and preferential consequence relations. Essentially, the theorem shows that
every preferential interpretation defines a preferential consequence relation,
and vice versa: that every preferential consequence relation is defined by a
corresponding preferential interpretation. Preferential interpretations there-
fore exactly correspond to preferential consequence relations.
To understand the expressivity of preferential interpretations, and asso-
ciated preferential consequence relations, consider the following defeasible
implications:
boat ∣∼ floats leaky ∣∼ boat leaky ∣∼ ¬floats (4.1)
Now, equipped with a preferential semantics, it is possible to evaluate what
expressivity has been gained. Recall that the classical semantics will claim
that leaky boats do not exist. What if it was certain that they do? Armed
with a preferential semantics, it is possible to construct an interpretation in
which leaky boats not only exist, but behave as expected. Define a prefer-
ential interpretation, P = ⟨S, l,≺⟩, such that l(s1) = blf, l(s2) = blf, l(s3) =
blf, l(s4) = blf, l(s5) = blf, l(s6) = blf. P is depicted visually below, with
each node representing a state, such that if s ≺ s′ then s is visually below
s′, connected by an edge. For readability, each state is labelled as l(s), i.e.,







Using P, it is possible to test the above set of statements for satisfiabil-
ity. For the first statement, it holds that boat ∣∼P floats as the minimal
state of boat, s4 ∶ blf, is also a model of floats, and so it is the case that
min(JboatKP) ⊩ floats. For the second statement, the minimal state sat-
isfying leaky is s5 ∶ blf, which also satisfies boat, and therefore it is the
case that leaky ∣∼P boat. Lastly, it is the case that leaky ∣∼P ¬floats,
as the minimal state satisfying leaky, s5 ∶ blf, is not a model of floats.
Therefore, every statement in this set of defeasible implications is satisfied by
a preferential interpretation, and so there exists a preferential consequence
relation, ∣∼P , per the representation theorem defined above, that includes the
above statements about leaky boats. Furthermore, P can be examined for
more defeasible implications. For example, note that float ∣∼P ¬leaky that
things that float are typically not leaky, which is an intuitive implication.
Preferential consequence relations and the preferential semantics behind
them have been described so far. In the next section, a specific subset of
preferential interpretations will be defined.
4.3 Ranked Interpretations
Ranked interpretations are a subset of preferential interpretations for which
the partial order satisfies the following property [49]:
Lemma 4.1.1. If ≺ is a strict partial order on a set V, then the following
conditions are equivalent:
1. for any x, y, z ∈ V, if x /≺ y, y /≺ x and z ≺ x, then z ≺ y;
2. for any x, y, z ∈ V, if x ≺ y, then either z ≺ y or x ≺ z;
3. there is a totally ordered set Ω, the strict order denoted by <, and a
function r ∶ V ↦ Ω called the ranking function such that s ≺ t if and
only if r(s) < r(t)
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Any partial order satisfying the above conditions is referred to as modular,
and results in a preferential interpretation, that rather than best resembling
a graph, instead can be visualized as a number of tiers populated by states,
and is referred to as a ranked interpretation due to this key difference. This
key difference, between modular partial orders and non-modular partial or-
ders, is simply that any two incomparable states will share the same tier:
this is the effect of the properties 1-3 in the above lemma. Given any two
states in a ranked interpretation, then either one is preferred, or they have
the same rank. This is different to preferential interpretations with a non-
modular partial order, where there could be many ways in which two states
are incomparable.
There are some interesting properties of ranked interpretations not shared
by preferential interpretations. Recall that different states in a preferential
interpretation may map to the same valuation. However, if the preference
ordering for a preferential interpretation is modular, then if there are two
states, s1 and s2, in a ranked interpretation, R, that map to the same valu-
ation, there are three possibilities:
1. s1 ≺ s2. In this case, the minimal state is s1, and s2 will never be
considered. Assuming that this is the only duplicate, then the ranked
interpretationR can be replaced by the ranked interpretationR′ that is
equivalent to R without s2, and represents the exact same consequence
relation as R.
2. s1 and s2 have the same rank, and in this case either can be removed
without losing or gaining any inferences, and, exactly as in the previous
case, can be replaced by an equivalent ranked interpretation that only
has one of these states.
3. s2 ≺ s1. This case is equivalent to the first case, and, analogously, s1
can be removed, creating a new ranked interpretation representing the
exact same consequence relation, with fewer states.
The key result of the above is that ranked interpretations do not need to allow
duplicate states, as preferential interpretations do. This can be formalized
by defining the set of ranked interpretations of interest as being all those
ranked interpretations containing no duplicate states. A direct implication
of having no duplicate states is that states no longer need to be part of the
definition of a ranked interpretation, rather the preference ordering simply
can be defined over the set of valuations U .
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To illustrate, given the valuations u, v,w, x, y ∈ U , then two ranked inter-
pretations, R1,R2 can be constructed such that R1 ∶= {{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}, l,≺}
with the following mapping from states to valuations:
• l(s1) = u
• l(s2) = v
• l(s3) = w
• l(s4) = x
• l(s5) = y
and such that R2 ∶= {{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}, l′,≺′} with the following mapping
from states to valuations:
• l(s1) = u
• l(s2) = v
• l(s3) = w
• l(s4) = x
• l(s5) = y
• l(s6) = v
Then the visual constructions of R1 and R2, showing the preference orderings











Notice that in R2, l′(s2) = l′(s6), however s2 ≺ s6. In this case, will s6
ever affect the answer to a given query? Since only the minimal valuations
will be considered, then clearly it will always be overruled by s2, and be
rendered irrelevant. A direct result is that R1 and R2 define the exact same
consequence relation, and are essentially interchangeable, which implies that
the notion of having states, while important for preferential interpretations,
is unnecessary for ranked interpretations. Rather, ranked interpretations can
be defined as a preference ordering on a set of valuations directly. Since the
preference ordering is modular, then, per the third point in Lemma 4.1.1, a
ranked interpretation can instead be thought of as a function from the set of
valuations to a totally ordered set. Therefore, a ranked interpretation R can
be defined as follows [26]:
Definition 4.7. A ranked interpretation is a function R ∶ U ↦ N ∪ {∞},
satisfying the following convexity property: for every i ∈ N , if there exists a
u ∈ U such that R(u) = i, then there must be a v ∈ U such that R(v) = j with
0 ≤ j < i.
The notation R(u) will be used to refer to the rank of u ∈ U in R. The
intuition behind the ranks is that valuations with a lower rank are more
typical, or normal, and valuations with infinite rank are impossible. As an
example, for some logic over the set of propositions P ∶= {p, q, r}, a ranked
interpretation R can be represented as:
∞ pqr pqr
2 pqr pqr
1 pqr pqr pqr
0 pqr
The above shows that R(pqr) = R(pqr) = ∞ and therefore pqr and pqr
are impossible, and pqr is the most preferred, as R(pqr) = 0, and therefore
represents the most typical world. Furthermore, R(pqr) = R(pqr) = 2, and
R(pqr) = R(pqr) = R(pqr) = 1. This notation and particular formulation
of ranked interpretations will be preferred for the rest of this dissertation.
Ranked interpretations are also preferential interpretations, and as such
they inherit all the properties of preferential interpretations. This includes
that just as a preferential interpretation defines a consequence relation, so
do ranked interpretations. This includes the notion of minimal states in
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preferential interpretations, which shall be redefined as follows following the
above definition of ranked interpretations:
Definition 4.8. Given a ranked interpretation R and any formula α ∈ L, it
holds that u ∈ JαKR is minimal if and only if there is no v ∈ JαKR such that
R(v) <R(u)
However, ranked interpretations do not exactly define just a preferen-
tial consequence relation, rather they define a rational consequence relation,
which is a specific type of preferential consequence relation, per the following
definition [49]:
Definition 4.9. A rational consequence relation is a consequence relation,
∣∼, that satisfies the previous KLM properties: Ref, And, Or, LLE, RW, CM,
along with the following property:
Rational monotonicity (RM):
α ∣∼ γ, α /∣∼ ¬β
α ∧ β ∣∼ γ
Rational consequence relations are linked to ranked interpretations in the
following way, analogous to preferential relations [49]:
Lemma 4.1.2. If R is a ranked interpretation, then it defines a rational
consequence relation ∣∼R such that α ∣∼R β if and only if for any u minimal
in JαKR, u ⊩ β.
Given the same R as above, then this lemma states that the consequence
relation it generates, ∣∼R is rational, and is defined with respect toR such that
for all α,β ∈ L then α ∣∼R β if and only if all minimal valuations satisfying α
also satisfy β. Note the valuations circled in R below:
∞ pqr pqr
2 pqr pqr
1 pqr pqr pqr
0 pqr
Both of the above circled valuations, pqr and pqr, are the minimal val-
uations of the atom q. Also note that both of them satisfy the atom p, and
so therefore q ∣∼R p.
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The importance of a consequence relation being rational lies in compar-
ing cautious monotonicity and rational monotonicity. In essence, CM states
that only information already derivable using the current knowledge will
never cause a retraction of an inference. On the other hand, rational mono-
tonicity weakens this constraint, but strengthens what can be included in the
consequence relation, by requiring that any new information, the negation
of which is not derivable using the current knowledge, should never cause
a retraction. The key difference is while cautious monotonicity states that
any knowledge already able to be inferred never invalidates a conclusion, ra-
tional monotonicity states that any new knowledge that does not contradict
with any prior inferences should not invalidate a conclusion. This is a funda-
mental shift in reasoning, as rational monotonicity, in contrast to any other
postulate, represents a negative rule. Whereas the other rules are phrased
“in the presence of this information, this is derivable”, RM is phrased as “in
the absence of this information, this is derivable”. The significance of this is
that it describes a model of reasoning that is much more willing to draw a
speculative inference that does not directly contradict any existing informa-
tion. Especially compared to cautious monotonicity; it should be noted that
given rational monotonicity, cautious monotonicity is implied, and therefore
not technically necessary when discussing rational consequence.
Why is rational monotonicity desirable? Consider the defeasible impli-
cation α ∣∼ β with α and β being different propositional formulas. Let γ be
a formula in L. Then it is intuitive to expect α ∧ γ ∣∼ β to be inferred. The
reasoning has been extensively discussed [46, 49] and boils down to that un-
less explicitly stated, there is nothing that should be assumed about γ that
would influence α to no longer imply β, and it is therefore sensible to infer
that α ∧ γ statements are not so different to α statements. This reasoning,
however, is not enforced by cautious monotonicity. Observe that there is no
reason to necessarily infer γ, and so therefore α∧γ ∣∼ β cannot be inferred by
a preferential consequence relation. However, note that rational monotonic-
ity will infer such a statement, as ¬γ is not inferred in the presence of α ∣∼ β,
and so rational monotonicity will derive α∧γ ∣∼ β. This is a strong argument
for rational monotonicity as a nonmonotonic replacement for monotonicity.
The next theorem is a representation theorem for rational consequence
relations and ranked interpretations [49]:
Theorem 4.2. A consequence relation ∣∼ on L is rational if and only if it
is the consequence relation defined by a ranked interpretation. Given a finite
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language, every rational consequence relation is defined by a finite ranked
interpretation.
The above representation theorem completes the link started by Lemma
4.1.2., by confirming it as an if and only if.
Ranked interpretations are a significant subset of preferential interpreta-
tions, however, in the next section preferential semantics will be revisited, to
define a notion of entailment with respect to these semantics.
4.4 Preferential Entailment
The question as to how to define entailment with respect to a preferential
semantics, is asking how to define what defeasible inferences follow from a
set of defeasible information. This represents a shift in the syntax. Note that
until now, ∣∼ was treated as a meta-level consequence relation over a classical
propositional language. Now that an entailment relation based on prefer-
ential semantics is to be defined, ∣∼ will now be treated as an object-level
connective, specifying explicitly defeasible information. This can be formal-
ized by defining a new language: LP ∶= L ∪ {α ∣∼ β ∣ α,β ∈ L}. From now, the
language referred to in this dissertation will be that of LP . Intuitively, LP is
that of propositional logic with the added connective ∣∼, which is a defeasible
counterpart to → and may be read as “typically implies”, but that may not
be nested. No formula of the type (α ∣∼ β) ∣∼ γ is valid in LP . A formal
definition of a defeasible implication is then:
Definition 4.10. A defeasible implication is a statement α ∣∼ β ∈ LP where
α,β ∈ L.
A set of defeasible implications forms a defeasible knowledge base:
Definition 4.11. A defeasible knowledge base, K, is a set of defeasible im-
plications, α ∣∼ β.
In this context, a defeasible knowledge base, also referred to in the lit-
erature as a conditional knowledge base, represents the explicit information,
as opposed to the set of inferences that follows from it. The semantics of LP
is that of the previously defined preferential semantics, and satisfaction in a
preferential interpretation can be defined as follows:
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Definition 4.12. Given a preferential interpretation P and a defeasible im-
plication α ∣∼ β, P satisfies α ∣∼ β, written P ⊩ α ∣∼ β if and only if for every
s minimal in JαKP , s ⊩ β. If P ⊩ α ∣∼ β then P is said to be a model of
α ∣∼ β.
The above definition can be extended to sets of defeasible implications:
Definition 4.13. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, a preferential inter-
pretation P satisfies K, written P ⊩ K if and only if for every α ∣∼ β ∈ K,
P ⊩ α ∣∼ β. If P ∣∼ K, then P is said to be a model of K.
A defeasible implication can also be a classical formula, as any classical
propositional formula can be expressed as a defeasible implication in the
following way:
Definition 4.14. A preferential interpretation P satisfies a formula α ∈ L,
written P ⊩ α, if and only if for all states s ∈ P then s ⊩ α.
The above definition states that a classical formula is satisfied in a prefer-
ential interpretation if it is satisfied by every state in the preferential interpre-
tation. This allows us to define classical formulas as a defeasible implication:
Corollary 4.2.1. Any formula α ∈ L can be expressed as a defeasible impli-
cation ¬α ∣∼ . For any preferential interpretation P, P ⊩ α if and only if
P ⊩ ¬α ∣∼ .
Note that JK = ∅, by definition, as  is the propositional constant repre-
senting false. Then, since P ⊩ ¬α ∣∼  if and only if J¬αKP ⊆ ∅, there are no
minimal states where α is false, and therefore α is true in P. Therefore, any
mention of a defeasible implication may also refer to classical statements, and
the nonmonotonic logic LP contains the classical propositional logic L, and,
in fact, extends classical logic [26]. Then, any result regarding defeasible
implications also applies to classical statements, by noting that any defeasi-
ble implication α ∣∼ β is equivalent to a classical statement γ whenever α is
logically equivalent to ¬γ and β is logically equivalent to .
Just as in classical logic, entailment, denoted with ⊧, is a meta-level
reasoning concept; from now any type of meta-level defeasible entailment
is denoted by ∣≈. Then, the statement K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β should be read as “the
knowledge base defeasibly entails that α typically implies β”. Recall that
a query is a propositional formula. Queries now will refer to any defeasible
implication α ∣∼ β, which includes any classical statement α.
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This section will define the first entailment relation that uses preferen-
tial semantics by applying Tarskian notions of consequence [56, 67], called
preferential entailment [49].
Definition 4.15. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and a defeasible im-
plication α ∣∼ β, preferential entailment, denoted ∣≈P , is defined as: K ∣≈P α ∣∼
β if and only if for every preferential model, P, of K, P ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
Preferential entailment essentially works analogously to classical entail-
ment: if a query is satisfied by every preferential model of a knowledge base,
then it is preferentially entailed by the knowledge base. This parallels clas-
sical entailment semantics, adjusted for preferential semantics.
The following theorems from KLM [46] and Lehmann and Magidor [49]
are significant in characterizing preferential entailment.
Theorem 4.3. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and a defeasible impli-
cation α ∣∼ β, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. α ∣∼ β is preferentially entailed by K, i.e., K ∣≈P α ∣∼ β.
2. for all preferential consequence relations ∣∼P , defined by a preferential
interpretation P, if P ⊩ K, then it is the case that α ∣∼P β.
3. α ∣∼ β has a proof from K using the following KLM postulates:
• (LLE) Left logical equivalence:
K ∣≈α↔β,K ∣≈α∣∼γ
K ∣≈β∣∼γ
• (RW) Right weakening:
K ∣≈α→β,K ∣≈γ∣∼α
K ∣≈γ∣∼β







• (CM) Cautious Monotonicity:
K ∣≈α∣∼γ,K ∣≈α∣∼β
K ∣≈α∧β∣∼γ
4. α ∣∼ β ∈ CnP(K), i.e., α ∣∼ β is in the consequence operation correspond-
ing to preferential entailment, CnP , of K.
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Point (2) defines preferential entailment in terms of preferential conse-
quence relations. Initially, Lehmann and Magidor [49] defined preferential
entailment in these terms. Essentially, it is possible to characterize the pat-
tern of reasoning of preferential entailment as a consequence relation: given
a defeasible knowledge base K, then define a consequence relation ∣∼ such
that for any α,β ∈ L, then α ∣∼ β if for every preferential interpretation
P that is a model of K, it holds that α ∣∼P β. The resulting consequence
relation ∣∼ is preferential and has a single corresponding preferential interpre-
tation. Alternatively, the consequence relation corresponding to preferential
entailment can be viewed as the intersection of all preferential consequence
relations: the set of defeasible implications agreed upon by all preferential
consequence relations.
Point (3) of the above theorem rephrases the KLM postulates that pre-
viously were defined as properties satisfied by all preferential consequence
relations. Recall that the properties previously were constraints on a con-
sequence relation ∣∼, and as such ∣∼ was a meta-level notion of consequence.
Now, as ∣∼ is an object-level connective, specifying explicit information, they
are presented slightly differently. ∣≈ is now the meta-level notion of conse-
quence, and ∣∼ is an object-level connective. In this form, the KLM postu-
lates form a deductive system for preferential entailment, where the set of
inference rules, R, are the KLM postulates as written above, and, in fact,
forms a Gentzen system for a defeasible language. This means that, given
some K, applying the KLM postulates as inference rules will yield all α ∣∼ β
that are preferentially entailed by K. Alternatively, every α ∣∼ β preferen-
tially entailed by K has a proof from K using some combination of the KLM
postulates. Naturally, this means that preferential entailment satisfies the
KLM postulates, and therefore, by the representation theorem for preferen-
tial interpretations, it can be defined by a single preferential interpretation,
which will be formalised in the following corollary of the above theorem, also
described by Lehmann and Magidor [49]:
Corollary 4.3.1. The set CnP(K) is a preferential consequence relation,
and therefore there is a preferential model satisfying exactly the defeasible
implications of CnP(K). If K is a preferential consequence relation, then
K = CnP(K). CnP(K) grows monotonically with K.
The above corollary, from Lehmann and Magidor [49], confirms that
there is a single preferential interpretation that can be used to define pref-
erential entailment, via the representation theorem defined in the previous
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section. Since there is a single preferential interpretation, P, that will in-
fer the same set of defeasible implications as preferential entailment, given
the same knowledge base K, it then follows that there is a preferential conse-
quence relation, ∣∼P , that will also infer the same set of defeasible implications
as preferential entailment.
The other significant implication of the last corollary is that preferen-
tial entailment is still monotonic. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, if
K∣≈Pα ∣∼ β, then for any defeasible implication γ ∣∼ δ, it will always hold that
K ∪ {γ ∣∼ δ} ∣≈P α ∣∼ β, and so if nonmonotonic entailment is the goal, then
the search continues.
By way of example, consider the knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,
boat ∣∼ sailors, ¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼ , leaky ∣∼ ¬floats}, containing sim-
ilar statements as from a previous section, with some additional defeasible
implications. Consider the following query: K ∣≈P leaky ∣∼ sailors, or do
leaky boats typically have sailors? Recall that for a defeasible implication
to be preferentially entailed, it must be satisfied by every preferential model
of the knowledge base. Consider the following preferential interpretation,
PK = ⟨S, l,≺⟩ with S = {l(s1) = blfs, l(s2) = blfs, l(s3) = blfs, l(s4) =
blfs, l(s5) = blfs, l(s6) = blfs, l(s7) = blfs, l(s8) = blfs, l(s9) = blfs,
l(s10) = blfs, l(s11) = blfs, l(s12) = blfs}. Note that, for brevity, each val-
uation refers to each proposition by the first letter only. The following tree












Is the above preferential interpretation a model of K? For it to be so,
each statement in K must be satisfied in the above interpretation. The first
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statement, boat ∣∼ floats is a defeasible implication, and therefore only the
minimal boat valuations need be checked in PK. The minimal boat valuation
is blfs, which is also a model of floats, and so PK ⊩ boat ∣∼ floats.
The second statement boat ∣∼ sailors can be checked against the same
valuation as the prior statement, as again only the minimal boat valuation
need be checked. Again blfs ⊩ sailors, and so PK ⊩ boat ∣∼ sailors. The
third statement, ¬(leaky→ boat) ∣∼ , is logically equivalent to the classical
statement leaky→boat and so needs to hold in all valuations of PK, not just
the minimal valuations. All valuations satisfying leaky are: blfs, blfs,
blfs, and blfs, all of which are also models of boat, and so therefore PK ⊩
¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼ . Lastly, the defeasible statement leaky∣∼ ¬floats
is satisfied by this interpretation, if and only if all the minimal valuations
satisfying leaky do not satisfy floats. The minimal leaky valuation is:
blfs, which does not satisfy floats, and so therefore it is the case that
PK ⊩ leaky ∣∼ ¬floats, and with the last statement it can be concluded
that PK ⊩ K, that this preferential interpretation is a model of K. Recall
that the query was whether K ∣≈P leaky ∣∼ sailors. Does this interpretation
satisfy the query statement? The minimal valuation of leaky is blfs, which
is not a model of sailors, and so therefore PK /⊩ leaky ∣∼ sailors. What is
the significance of this? Recall that a knowledge base K preferentially entails
a defeasible statement α if and only if every preferential model of K is also
a model of α. The above interpretation is a counterexample, and so it can
be concluded that K /∣≈P leaky ∣∼ sailors. This example is representative
of what preferential entailment cannot entail. This pattern of reasoning,
inheritance of properties for exceptional sub-classes, is one not satisfied by
preferential entailment.
However, there are schools of thought that claim that preferential entail-
ment is enough [39]. Preferential reasoning is perfectly adequate to reason
about a defeasible knowledge base, since the object language is nonmono-
tonic, and ∣∼ is strong enough for a nonmonotonic logic. Giordano et al. [39]
argue that the addition of rational monotonicity as an inference rule may re-
sult in undesirable inferences, and therefore preferential reasoning is strong
enough. However, their argument is based in description logic ABox reason-
ing, and therefore not particularly relevant in the context of propositional
logic.
However, this work is, of course, interested in nonmonotonic reasoning,
and in that context preferential entailment is, while a significant formalism,




Having defined ranked interpretations and preferential entailment, it is worth
examining the same result restricted to ranked interpretations. It was shown
that preferential entailment is the result of a Tarskian pattern of entailment
using preferential interpretations, and so it is now time to investigate what
ranked entailment looks like. It should be clear that the pattern this process
will follow will be identical to the process of defining preferential entailment
from preferential interpretations.
Therefore, define ranked entailment as follows [49]:
Definition 4.16. Given a knowledge base K, and a defeasible implication
α ∣∼ β, K ∣≈R α ∣∼ β, read as K rank entails α ∣∼ β, if and only if for every
ranked interpretation, R, such that R ⊩ K, it is the case that R ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
In other words, K rank entails a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β if every
ranked interpretation satisfying K also satisfies α ∣∼ β, and vice versa. The
result is exactly preferential entailment [49]:
Theorem 4.4. Given a knowledge base K and a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β
it is the case that K ∣≈R α ∣∼ β if and only if K ∣≈P α ∣∼ β.
There are a few rationales for ranked entailment being identical to pref-
erential entailment. One explanation is that ranked entailment represents
all of those inferences that every ranked interpretation satisfies. Each of
these inferences, via the representation theorem, has a proof using the KLM
postulates, including rational monotonicity. It should be noted that each
postulate is phrased positively, meaning that each state “in the presence of
the above, derive the below”, with the exception of RM, which is phrased “in
the presence of one statement, and the absence of another statement above,
derive the statement below”. This results in a number of different inferences
satisfied by different interpretation. When taking the intersection of all these
different interpretations, which results in ranked entailment, the result is the
smallest group of inferences that all interpretations agree on. This intuitively
would result in the set of inferences with a proof using the first six postulates,
and without any inferences with a proof using RM, as there would exist at
least one interpretation that does not agree with such an inference.
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An interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the above, is that
rational consequence relations are not closed under intersection [48]. This is
different from preferential consequence relations, as it has been demonstrated
that the intersection of all preferential relations is itself a preferential relation:
preferential entailment. However, the intersection of all rational consequence
relations is not a rational relation; rather it is a preferential relation: again
preferential entailment.
Since ranked entailment is still monotonic, the question of how to define a
nonmonotonic entailment relation using preferential semantics remains. Ad-
ditionally, as will be described, it is not enough for an entailment relation
to be nonmonotonic, as there are very many nonmonotonic entailment rela-
tions, in contrast to classical entailment. Rather, nonmonotonic entailment
relations that are rational in the same way as rational consequence relations
- satisfying the KLM postulates - are the class of entailment relations that
are desirable. The intuition behind this is straightforward: given a defeasible
knowledge base, K, and a nonmonotonic entailment relation, ∣≈, then the set
of statements of the form α ∣∼ β that follow from K, along with every α ∣∼ β
already in K, together form a consequence relation ∣∼CR. If ∣≈ is rational, then





Defeasible knowledge bases have been defined, as well as preferential and
ranked entailments for those knowledge bases, which were shown to still be
monotonic. This chapter will describe how to define nonmonotonic entail-
ment relations using preferential semantics. The core entailment relation
that will be the focus of the majority of this chapter is rational closure. The
main reason for this is that it was the first nonmonotonic entailment relation
defined by Lehmann and Magidor [49], and, due to its status as the most
conservative nonmonotonic entailment relation, forms what will be termed
the nonmonotonic core of defeasible entailment, analogous to how preferen-
tial entailment will be shown to be the monotonic core. First, rational closure
will be defined semantically, and then it will be shown how this semantics can
be used to define rational closure over the statements in the knowledge base
itself. After rational closure is described, a general framework for generat-
ing defeasible entailment will be built up, with the view of defining iterative
classes of entailment relations by extending the KLM framework with more
properties, isolating desirable entailment relations in a systematic fashion.
5.1 Minimal Ranked Entailment
In the previous chapter, ranked entailment was described and was shown to
be exactly preferential entailment, and therefore monotonic. The question
then remains, how to define a semantics for a nonmonotonic entailment re-
lation? This section will answer such a question, by describing what will be
termed minimal ranked entailment.
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First, a definition for some notation:
Definition 5.1. Given a defeasible knowledge base K and any α, β ∈ L the
notation α < β in K is shorthand for K ∣≈ α ∨ β ∣∼ ¬β. Additionally, α ≤ β is
shorthand for β < α not being in K.
Now, consider two consequence operators, each resulting in a different ra-
tional consequence relation, Cn1 and Cn2, operating over the same knowledge
base K. Lehmann and Magidor [49] showed that it is possible to define a
preference ordering between them, such that Cn1(K) ≺ Cn2(K) if and only if:
1. there exists a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β in Cn2(K) ∖ Cn1(K) such
that for all γ such that γ < α in Cn1(K), and for all δ such that γ ∣∼ δ
is in Cn1(K), there is also γ ∣∼ δ in Cn2(K), and
2. for any λ, θ if λ ∣∼ θ is in Cn1(K)∖Cn2(K) there is a defeasible implica-
tion ρ ∣∼ η in Cn2(K) ∖ Cn1(K) such that ρ < λ for Cn2(K)
The above definition can prove difficult to understand intuitively, however the
intuition is that the valid arguments for hypothetical proponents of different
rational consequence relations might go as follows:
1. Proponent of Cn1: your relation contains an implication, α ∣∼ β, that
mine does not, and therefore contains an unsupported inference.
2. Proponent of Cn2: yes, but your relation contains an implication γ ∣∼ δ
that mine does not, and you yourself think that γ refers to a situation
that is more usual than the one referred to by α.
In the formal definition above, (1) refers to a valid attack that a relation A
may have against another relation B, and (2) refers to the absence of such
an attack existing for B against A. Using the above intuition, in the formal
definition above, Cn1(K) ≺ Cn2(K) if Cn1(K) has an attack that Cn2(K)
cannot defend against, while the negation is true for Cn2(K), meaning that
it has no attack of its own.
The intuitive definition above describes a valid attack, and a correspond-
ing valid defense against an attack, which essentially describes two incompa-
rable notions of consequence. This is not a complete correspondence to the
formal definition, which defines when they are comparable: (2) in the formal
definition describes the negation of the attack, i.e., that Cn2 has no attack,
and not that Cn2 has a defense.
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Given the above defined preference relation, a partial order can be defined
over all ranked models of K. This partial order, denoted ⪯K can be defined
semantically as follows [26]:
Definition 5.2. Given a knowledge base, K, and RK the set of all ranked
interpretations of K, it holds for every RK1 ,RK2 ∈ RK that RK1 ⪯K RK2 if and
only if for every u ∈ U , RK1 (u) ≤RK2 (u).
The intuition is that ranked interpretations that have their valuations
“pushed down” as much as possible are preferred, and such interpretations
also represent a more conservative pattern of reasoning.
The two different levels of preference orders employed in the above defi-
nition should be noted. Observe the distinction between the modular partial
order within each ranked interpretation, that defines a total pre-order on val-
uations, and the more meta-level partial order over all ranked interpretations
defining which interpretations have valuations that are more “pushed down”,
which corresponds to a more conservative form of reasoning.
Giordano et al. [38] showed that the partially ordered set ⟨R,⪯K⟩ has
a minimal element, which will be denoted as RKRC . This leads us to the
following definition:
Definition 5.3. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, the minimal ranked
interpretation satisfying K, RKRC, defines an entailment relation, ∣≈, called
minimal ranked entailment, such that for any defeasible implication α ∣∼ β,
K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β if and only if RKRC ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
That RRC defines a rational entailment relation is a result of the represen-
tation theorem. In the same way that a ranked interpretation can generate
a rational consequence relation, similarly it generates an entailment relation
satisfying all the KLM postulates.
To show the intuition behind ⪯K, given a defeasible knowledge base K,
there will be a finite number of ranked interpretations, RK. Then, the fol-





The key takeaway from the above visual is that RKRC is the minimal
element of the set, and will always be for any knowledge base. The structure
and size of the set will differ, but there will be a minimum, and that minimum
will be designated RKRC .
Each preferential interpretation can be viewed as codifying a pattern of
reasoning, some that are sensible, and others not. Preferential entailment
can then be viewed as the pattern of reasoning that accepts all conclusions
that are agreed upon by every preferential interpretation, and it was shown
that there is a single preferential interpretation that corresponds exactly
to preferential entailment’s pattern of reasoning. Then, as every ranked
interpretation is also a preferential interpretation, each ranked interpretation
also codifies a pattern of reasoning. RRC , as the minimal interpretation,
represents the most conservative pattern of truly defeasible reasoning codified
by a ranked interpretation.
As an example to illustrate that minimal ranked entailment is truly
nonmonotonic, consider our leaky boat knowledge base, now with the Fly-
ing Dutchman: K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats, ¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼ , leaky ∣∼
¬floats,¬(FlyingDutchman→ boat) ∣∼ }
All that is known about the flying dutchman at this point is that it is a
boat, and therefore the assumption is made that it is a typical boat. The
minimal ranked model of this knowledge base, RK, is therefore:
∞ bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld
2 bfld bfld
1 bfld bfld
0 bfld bfld bfld bfld
For brevity, the propositions have been shortened: b is boat, f is floats,
l is leaky and d is the FlyingDutchman. So, what does this ranked model
entail? Notice that RK ⊩ FlyingDutchman ∣∼ floats, or in other words it
follows that the Flying Dutchman typically floats, which makes sense, since it
is known that it is a boat, and it is known that boats typically float. Suppose
the statement ¬(FlyingDutchman→ leaky) ∣∼  was added to the knowledge
base. So, the adjusted minimal ranked model of K ∪ {¬(FlyingDutchman →
leaky) ∣∼ }, which shall be denoted RK1 should look like:
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∞ bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld
2 bfld bfld
1 bfld bfld
0 bfld bfld bfld
Now, notice that RK1 /⊩ FlyingDutchman ∣∼ floats, and instead it is the
case that RK1 ⊩ FlyingDutchman ∣∼ ¬floats. In other words, upon adding
information, a previous inference was retracted. This is the nonmonotonic
nature of minimal ranked entailment. Suppose this was taken a step further,
and the statement ¬(FlyingDutchman → floats) ∣∼  was added to the
knowledge base. The resultant minimal ranked model, denoted RK2 , should
be:
∞ bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld bfld
2 bfld bfld
1 bfld
0 bfld bfld bfld
Now notice that RK2 ⊩ FlyingDutchman → floats and RK2 ⊩ boat ∧
leaky ∣∼ ¬floats. In this way, exceptionality can be “nested” using minimal
ranked entailment, with exceptions to exceptions being handled sensibly. The
above minimal ranked models of K, can be used to tell the story of an agent
that employs a form of common sense reasoning, which still is nevertheless
relatively conservative. Initially, all that is known about boats is that they
float, with the exception of those that are leaky. Additionally, the agent is
aware of a specific boat called the Flying Dutchman, but that is all. From
this, the agent is willing to conclude that the Flying Dutchman is a typical
boat, that floats. Upon learning that the Flying Dutchman is in fact leaky,
then the agent revises his conclusions, and no longer concludes that it is a
typical boat, but that it is a typical leaky boat, and therefore does not float.
The agent has therefore changed their mind, and retracted a conclusion about
the Flying Dutchman being able to float. However, the agent then learns that
in fact the Flying Dutchman is a ghost ship, and despite being leaky is still
able to float. Now the agent knows that it is not even a typical leaky boat,
and withdraws the conclusion that it does not float.
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5.2 Rational closure
There is an alternative syntactic definition of minimal ranked entailment,
which is a direct result of the semantic definition from the previous section,
as well as preferential entailment. First, a necessary preliminary definition
from Lehmann and Magidor [49]:
Definition 5.4. The material counterpart of a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β
is the propositional formula α → β. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, the
material counterpart of K, denoted Ð→K , is the set of material counterparts,
α → β, for every defeasible implication α ∣∼ β ∈ K.
The material counterpart is also referred to as a materialisation. The
utility of the materialisation of a knowledge base was also demonstrated by
Lehmann and Magidor [49], as it can be used to calculate those classical
formulas satisfied by the most preferred valuations of a defeasible knowledge
base, per the following lemma:
Lemma 5.0.1. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and α ∈ L a formula,
it holds that
Ð→K ⊧ α if and only if K ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ α.
The utility of the above lemma may be dubious, at first, but it is a key
result for defining exceptionality [49]:
Definition 5.5. Given a knowledge base, K, a propositional formula, α, is
said to be exceptional for K if and only if K ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ ¬α.
In natural language, the above definition states that a formula is excep-
tional for a knowledge base if the negation of the formula is typical in every
preferential interpretation satisfying the knowledge base. Each formula α ∈ L
is essentially a statement about the world. An exceptional formula can be
thought of as a statement about the world that is false in all the best worlds
of K, but it may perhaps be true in a less typical world.
Exceptionality uses preferential entailment to demarcate levels of speci-
ficity in a knowledge base. Depending on the information encoded, there
may be one to many levels of exceptional information.
Then, this can be used to define a function ε on a knowledge base that re-
turns a subset of the knowledge base consisting of every defeasible statement
having an antecedent exceptional in the original knowledge base. Formally:
ε(K) ∶= {α ∣∼ β ∣ K ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ ¬α}
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Using this function, it is possible to define an iterative sequence of knowledge
bases as follows:
Definition 5.6. EK0 ≡def K, EKi ≡def ε(EKi−1) for every 0 < i < n, and EK∞ ≡def EKn ,
where n is the smallest k such that EKk = EKk+1.
It should be noted that EK
∞
= ∅, under the conditions that there are no
formulas in the knowledge base that are exceptional for every level. In the
case that EK
∞
is non-empty, then it represents those formulas in K that are
logically equivalent to , and therefore a classical formula, α, or the defeasible
representation ¬α ∣∼ , is in the rational closure of a knowledge base if and
only if br(¬α) =∞ [26]. Formulas with infinite rank are also referred to as
having no rank in the literature [48, 49].
Note that since K is defined as finite, n must exist. Now that the sequence
EK0 ...EK∞ is defined, the base rank of a formula may be defined [26]:
Definition 5.7. brK(α), referred to as the base rank of α, with respect to
a given defeasible knowledge base K, is the smallest r such that α is not
exceptional in EKr , and is defined: brK(α) ∶= min{r ∣ EKr /∣≈R ⊺ ∣∼ ¬α}
It should be noted that the base rank of any defeasible implication is the
base rank of the antecedent: brK(α ∣∼ β) ≡ brK(α). The intuition behind
assigning each defeasible implication a rank is that the lower the rank, the
more defeasible the statement. Given two formulas α,β ∈ L, if br(α) < br(β),
then α represents a more general statement than β, and therefore is more
defeasible information, while defeasible implications with infinite rank are
classical statements, true in every valuation in every ranked model of K.
Given the knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats, leaky ∧ ¬boat ∣∼ ,
leaky ∣∼ ¬floats}, the above partitioning procedure will provide the follow-
ing:
• E0 = K = {boat ∣∼ floats, leaky∧¬boat ∣∼ , leaky ∣∼ ¬floats} then it
is the case that E0 ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ ¬leaky and E0 ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ ¬(leaky∧¬boat), and
so leaky and leaky∧¬boat are both exceptional, while boat ∣∼ floats
is not.
• Then, E1 = {leaky ∧ ¬boat ∣∼ , leaky ∣∼ ¬floats}, for which it holds
that E1 ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ ¬(leaky∧¬boat) and so leaky∧¬boat ∣∼  is exceptional
for E1 and leaky ∣∼ ¬floats is not exceptional.
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• E2 = {leaky∧¬boat ∣∼ } for which E2 ∣≈P ¬(leaky∧¬boat) holds, and
so therefore leaky ∧ ¬boat ∣∼  is exceptional for E2
• E3 = E2 = {leaky∧¬boat ∣∼ } and so the procedure terminates. There-
fore, boat ∣∼ floats has base rank 0, leaky ∣∼ ¬floats has base rank
1, and leaky ∧ ¬boat ∣∼  has base rank ∞.
Using this definition of base rank, a form of nonmonotonic entailment
called rational closure [49] can be defined as such [38]:
Definition 5.8. Given a knowledge base K, a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β is
said to be in the rational closure of K, and written K ∣≈RC α ∣∼ β, if and only
if brK(α) < brK(α ∧ ¬β) or brK(α) =∞.
The above definition of a defeasible entailment relation uses the base
rank of a propositional formula, that acts directly on the syntax. While this
is a consequence of previously defined semantics, this particular approach
can be implemented purely with a classical entailment SAT solver [49].
At this point, the connection between rational closure and minimal ranked
entailment, defined previously, may be of interest. The following observation,
also from Giordano et al. [38] provides the fundamental connection between
base ranks and the ranks of valuations in the minimal ranked model RKRC :
Theorem 5.1. For every knowledge base K and α ∈ L, brK(α) =min{i ∣ ∃v ∈ α̂
such that RKRC(v) = i}.
A consequence of the above observation is that rational closure will con-
clude the exact same set of inferences as minimal ranked entailment:
Corollary 5.1.1. Given a defeasible knowledge base K and a defeasible im-
plication α ∣∼ β, it holds that K ∣≈RC α ∣∼ β if and only if RKRC ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
That is, minimal ranked entailment is in fact the semantic definition of
rational closure.
5.3 Algorithm for Rational Closure
In the previous sections, rational closure was defined semantically, and then
as base ranks on propositional sentences. Now, an algorithm to compute the
rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base K will be presented.
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The first procedure to define, BaseRank, is an algorithm on K that com-
putes the base rank, br, defined in the previous section, of every formula,
mapping every explicit propositional formula in K to the set of natural num-
bers and infinity: {0,1,2,3, ...} ∪∞. BaseRank takes a defeasible knowledge
base K as input, but the majority of the procedure is performed on the ma-
terialisation,
Ð→K , recall the definition as Ð→K ∶= {α → β ∣ α ∣∼ β ∈ K}. The
output will therefore be a tuple of sets of classical implications that are the
material counterparts to the defeasible implications in K, corresponding to
the sequence EKn of exceptional subsets of K.
As required for a well-defined base rank, the algorithm satisfies the spec-
ified constraints for br, that there can be no “gaps” in between ranks, and
BaseRank will assign each propositional formula the lowest possible rank,
while still respecting exceptionality.
Algorithm 1 BaseRank
1: Input: A knowledge base K
2: Output: An ordered tuple (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n)
3: i := 0;
4: E0 :=
Ð→K ;
5: while Ei−1 ≠ Ei do
6: Ei+1 := {α → β ∈ Ei ∣ Ei ⊧ ¬α};
7: Ri := Ei ∖Ei+1;
8: i := i + 1;
9: end while
10: R∞ := Ei−1;
11: if Ei−1 = ∅ then
12: n := i − 1;
13: else
14: n := i;
15: end if
16: return (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n)
The next algorithm, RationalClosure, takes as input K, and a defeasible
query α ∣∼ β, and returns true if the query is entailed by K, and false
otherwise. RationalClosure makes use of a classical entailment checker
a polynomial number of times in the size of K, and therefore computing




1: Input: A knowledge base K, and a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β
2: Output: true, if K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β, and false otherwise
3: (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n) := BaseRank(K);
4: i := 0
5: R := ⋃j<ni=0 Rj;
6: while R∞ ∪R ⊧ ¬α and R ≠ ∅ do
7: R := R ∖Ri;
8: i := i + 1;
9: end while
10: return R∞ ∪R ⊧ α → β;
The above algorithm essentially works by checking if there exists an ex-
ceptional subset of the knowledge base such that the query is entailed. If the
materialisation of the full knowledge base classically entails the negation of
the antecedent of the defeasible query, then the antecedent is an exceptional
formula, as well as the query itself, and so it removes all statements of the
lowest rank in the knowledge base, and performs the same check, until the
antecedent is no longer exceptional. Once a rank is found for which the an-
tecedent is not exceptional, then the algorithm checks if the materialisation
of the query is entailed, and outputs the result.
It has been shown by Freund [33] that RationalClosure, given a defea-
sible knowledge base K and a query α ∣∼ β, returns true if and only if α ∣∼ β
is in the rational closure of K:
Theorem 5.2. Given a knowledge base K and a query α ∣∼ β as input,
RationalClosure returns true if and only if K ∣≈RC α ∣∼ β.
To illustrate how this algorithm works, consider the knowledge base
K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,leaky ∣∼ boat,leaky ∣∼ ¬floats,FlyingDutchman ∣∼
boat,FlyingDutchman ∣∼ leaky}, and query FlyingDutchman ∣∼ ¬floats.
Then the material counterpart to K is Ð→K ∶= {boat→ floats, leaky→ boat,
leaky → ¬floats, FlyingDutchman → boat, FlyingDutchman → leaky},
and the material counterpart to the query is FlyingDutchman→ ¬floats.
Then applying the BaseRank algorithm will assign each formula in
Ð→K ,
which now can be designated as E0, in the following way:
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1.
Ð→K = E0 ⊧ ¬leaky and E0 ⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman and so E1 ∶= {leaky →
boat,leaky → ¬floats,FlyingDutchman → boat,FlyingDutchman →
leaky}.
2. E1 has no exceptional antecedents, and so E2 ∶= ∅.
3. E2 has no exceptional antecedents and so E3 ∶= ∅. Since E2 = E3, then
the loop is terminated.
The BaseRank algorithm will then output the following tuple: ({boat →
floats}, {leaky → boat, leaky → ¬floats, FlyingDutchman → boat,
FlyingDutchman → leaky}, ∅,3). This tuple is then used to construct the




leaky→ boat leaky→ ¬floats
FlyingDutchman→ boat FlyingDutchman→ leaky
R0 boat→ floats
Then, to apply the RationalClosure algorithm, first it needs to be
checked if R0 ∪ R1 ∪ R∞ ⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman. Note that it does, as there
no models of R0 ∪R1 ∪R∞ that satisfy FlyingDutchman. Then, all formulas
of rank 0 are removed, leaving the following knowledge base, E1:
∞ ∅
1
leaky→ boat leaky→ ¬floats
FlyingDutchman→ boat FlyingDutchman→ leaky
Then, is it the case that R1 ∪ R∞ ⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman? Enumerating
the set of valuations, written in the same form used previously, satisfy-
ing R1 ∪ R∞ yields the set U= {blfd, blfd, blfd, blfd, blfd, blfd}, of
which there is a valuation where FlyingDutchman is true, and so R1 ∪R∞ /⊧
¬FlyingDutchman. So then FlyingDutchman is not exceptional, and now the
algorithm checks if R1 ∪R∞ ⊧ FlyingDutchman → ¬floats. Note that only
one valuation, blfd, has FlyingDutchman as true, and since floats is false
in this valuation, it is indeed the case that R1 ∪ R∞ ⊧ FlyingDutchman →
¬floats, and so the output will be true.
The above example illustrates how rational closure, a nonmonotonic en-
tailment relation, can be computed algorithmically using a regular classical
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satisfiability checker. This example can be checked against the example for
minimal ranked entailment to see that it does indeed correspond to the ra-
tional closure of K.
5.4 Rational Entailment
So far, what has been described is the beginnings of a framework for de-
feasible reasoning using a preferential semantics, from which some syntactic
approaches may be formalised. However, just one entailment relation, ratio-
nal closure, has been described so far. Rational closure is generated from the
minimal ranked model of a knowledge base. Per the representation theorem,
every other ranked model of a knowledge base also generates a rational de-
feasible entailment relation. This raises the question: are all such entailment
relations worthy of being examined? The immediate answer is that they
are not [26]. The KLM postulates, while elegant and useful, are not quite
restrictive enough to isolate the useful ranked models of a knowledge base.
They do not, for example, require that every defeasible statement given ex-
plicitly in the knowledge base is defeasibly entailed. The KLM postulates
were not intended to purely describe all useful defeasible entailment, either,
as providing a nonmonotonic deductive system that corresponds to a prefer-
ential semantics is a complete system. However, the goal here is to extend
it with the view that it is possible, and useful, to create a system such that
any common sense pattern of reasoning can be formalised as a defeasible
entailment relation, and that only those common sense patterns of reasoning
are described.
So, then what is a reasonable way to prune the ranked models of a knowl-
edge base such that only those sensible entailment relations may be gener-
ated? Firstly, the class of ranked interpretations examined until this point
all satisfy the KLM postulates. All of these will now be referred to as LM-
rational. Formally, LM-rationality is defined as follows [26]:
Definition 5.9. Any defeasible entailment relation ∣≈ satisfying the following
KLM postulates:
1. (LLE) Left logical equivalence:
K ∣≈α↔β,K ∣≈α∣∼γ
K ∣≈β∣∼γ











6. (CM) Cautious Monotonicity:
K ∣≈α∣∼γ,K ∣≈α∣∼β
K ∣≈α∧β∣∼γ
7. (RM) Rational Monotonicity:
K ∣≈α∣∼γ,K /∣≈α/∣∼β
K ∣≈α∧β∣∼γ
is referred to as LM-rational.
This next result follows directly from the representation theorem for
ranked interpretations:
Corollary 5.2.1. A defeasible entailment relation is LM-rational if and only
if it is defined by a ranked interpretation.
Lehmann and Magidor [49] showed that LM-rationality is a necessary
condition for any defeasible entailment relation to satisfy. The contention
here is that it is not sufficient. By way of example, consider the Flying
Dutchman knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,leaky ∣∼ boat,leaky ∣∼
¬floats,FlyingDutchman ∣∼ boat,FlyingDutchman ∣∼ leaky}. Then the fol-
lowing ranked interpretation RK can be constructed, where meta-atoms are
used to represent the atoms in K, such that b is boat, f is floats, l is leaky,
and d is FlyingDutchman:
5 blfd blfd blfd blfd blfd blfd





RK represents an LM-rational entailment relation, by the above repre-
sentation theorem. Then this entailment relation, ∣≈, is such that K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β
if and only if RK ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
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First, note that RK is indeed a ranked model of K, that RK ⊩ K.
Then what inferences are entailed by the knowledge base? Note that RK ⊩
¬FlyingDutchman ∣∼ boat∧floats, that anything that is not a Flying Dutch-
man, is typically a floating boat. Additionally, note that RK ⊩ floats ∣∼
boat, that things that float are typically boats.
The ranked model RK represents a pattern of reasoning that is, while
perhaps valid from a specific, closed-world, point of view, very flawed. There
is no reason for either of the above inferences to follow from the ranked model,
especially in light of a defeasible knowledge base which generally represents a
common sense view of the world and not any kind of totality of information.
In conclusion, there is a need of some kind of extension of LM-rationality,
in order to isolate those ranked models representing a pattern of reasoning
that is desirable.
5.4.1 Basic Defeasible Entailment
Since LM-rationality is not enough, the first pass at trying to throw out
nonsensical entailment relations is to add some basic properties that constrain
what should always be entailed by a defeasible knowledge base. The following
three properties all state what a defeasible entailment relation, ∣≈, should at
least infer:
• Inclusion: for every α ∣∼ β ∈ K, K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β
• Classic Preservation: K ∣≈ α ∣∼  if and only if K ∣≈P α ∣∼ 
• Classic Consistency: K ∣≈ ⊺ ∣∼  if and only if K ∣≈P ⊺ ∣∼ 
Inclusion simply requires that all defeasible implications in K are also defea-
sibly entailed by K, and can be thought of as a defeasible analogue to the
Tarskian property of inclusion for classical consequence. Classic preservation
states that those defeasible implications that correspond to classical sen-
tences should be exactly the same as those that are preferentially entailed in
K. Classic consistency is a direct corollary of classic preservation, by stating
that a knowledge base can only be satisfiable if it is satisfiable with respect
to preferential entailment.
These properties lead us to the first proper class of defeasible entailment
relations:
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Definition 5.10. Any defeasible entailment relation satisfying LM-rationality,
Inclusion, and Classic Preservation is referred to as a basic defeasible entail-
ment relation.
There are a number of derived properties of basic defeasible entailment.
An important one is that of K-faithfulness:
Definition 5.11. Given the ranked interpretation RKR representing the ranked
interpretation corresponding to ranked entailment, any ranked model R of a
defeasible knowledge base K is K-faithful if the set of valuations in R with
non-infinite rank is the same as the set of possible valuations of K. That is,
for every u ∈ U then R(u) ≠∞ if and only if RKR(u) ≠∞.
K-faithfulness essentially defines the semantics for basic defeasible entail-
ment: the set of ranked models that are K-faithful define the set of basic
defeasible entailment relations.
Recall that the rational closure of a knowledge base K is defined by the
minimal ranked interpretation satisfying K, RKRC . This ranked interpretation,
RKRC , is K-faithful, and therefore is a basic defeasible entailment relation.
As a visualization of this class of entailment relations, let the following
rectangle represent the set of all ranked interpretations, that are therefore
LM-rational, given some defeasible knowledge base:
R
Then, the set of basic defeasible entailments is the subset of these ranked
interpretations that are K-faithful:
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K − faithful R
R
So, basic defeasible entailment is defined as a subset of the ranked in-
terpretations of a knowledge base, of which the ranked interpretation corre-
sponding to the rational closure of a knowledge base is an element:
RKRC
K − faithful R
R
Having therefore defined the semantics for basic defeasible entailment,
paralleling the rational closure definition, it is possible to define basic defea-
sible entailment in terms of ranks on formulas, by generalising the notion of
base rank, br [26]:
Definition 5.12. Let r : L ↦ N ∪ {∞} be a rank function with r(⊺) = 0,
satisfying the following convexity property: for every i ∈ N , if r(α) = i then,
for every j such that 0 ≤ j < i, there exists β ∈ L such that r(β) = j. r is
entailment preserving if α ⊧ β implies r(α) ≥ r(β). r is K-faithful if:
• it is entailment preserving;
• r(α) < r(α ∧ ¬β) or r(α) =∞, for every α ∣∼ β ∈ K, and
• r(α) =∞ if and only if K ∣≈R α ∣∼ 
Note, that base rank, brK(.) is K-faithful. Just as the base rank function
can define an entailment relation, so too can any ranking function [26]:
67
Definition 5.13. A rank function r ∶ L ↦ N ∪ {∞} generates a defeasible
entailment relation, ∣≈, whenever K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β if r(α) < r(α ∧¬β) or r(α) =∞.
Essentially, whereas br is a ranking function over formulas that defines
the rational closure of a knowledge base, the ranking function r is a more
general concept that defines any defeasible entailment relation.
A ranking function, r, is considered to be entailment preserving if its
ranking respects the classical logical consequence relationships between the
formulas themselves: if β ∈ L is a logical consequence of α ∈ L, then β
should not be of higher rank than α. Furthermore, it is K-faithful if, in
addition to being entailment preserving, for any α ∈ L such that ¬α is true
in every valuation in every ranked model of K, then r(α) = ∞, and if for
every defeasible implication α ∣∼ β ∈ K the rank assigned to α is strictly lower
than the rank of α without β or otherwise the rank of α is infinite. The last
criterion can be difficult to understand, but it essentially is a defeasible form
of entailment preservation, that forces the ranks to respect the defeasible
consequences.
The meaning of the ranks assigned to the formulas corresponds to the
meaning of the base rank of a formula. The lower the rank, the more specific
the underlying statement it represents. However, whereas the base rank of a
formula is a result, the more general rank of a formula from some r is more
declarative, and therefore, much like with a ranked interpretation, the ranks
a ranking function assigns to formulas in a language encodes a pattern of
reasoning, or a particular reading of the knowledge, that directly results in
an entailment relation.
Having defined a ranking function, algorithms to compute a basic defea-
sible entailment can be presented. The first procedure, Rank performs the
same role as the previous algorithm for rational closure, BaseRank, but it
is generalized to basic defeasible entailment, and outputs a sequence of sen-
tences, as opposed to how BaseRank outputs a sequence of sets of sentences.
However, it does require the specific ranking function to be provided, which
would correspond to the exact entailment relation to be computed. The
algorithm DefeasibleEntailment answers whether a query is entailed ac-
cording to some entailment relation, specified by the Rank algorithm. Again,
DefeasibleEntailment is a generalized version of the RationalClosure al-
gorithm. Running DefeasibleEntailment with BaseRank as an input would
result in the rational closure as the output.
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Algorithm 3 DefeasibleEntailment
1: Input: A knowledge base K, a K-faithful rank function r, and a defeasible
implication α ∣∼ β
2: Output: true, if K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β, and false otherwise
3: (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n) := Rank(K, r);
4: i := 0
5: R := ⋃j<ni=0 {Rj};
6: while {R∞} ∪R ⊧ ¬α and R ≠ ∅ do
7: R := R ∖ {Ri};
8: i := i + 1;
9: end while
10: return {R∞} ∪R ⊧ α → β;
For the following Rank function, let [α] ∶= {β ∣ α ≡ β, β ∈ L}, that is all
formulas logically equivalent to α.
Algorithm 4 Rank
1: Input: A knowledge base K and a K-faithful rank function r
2: Output: An ordered tuple (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n)
3: R∞ := ¬(⋁r([α])=∞[α]);
4: n := max{i ∈ N ∣ ∃α ∈ L s.t. r(α) = i};
5: if n = 0 then
6: R0 := ⊺;
7: n := 1;
8: else
9: for i := 0 to n − 1 do
10: Ri ≡def ¬(⋁r([α])=i+1[α])
11: end for
12: end if
13: return (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n)
Rank produces a tuple of formulas logically equivalent to the material
counterparts to the defeasible implications in K, received as input, ordered
according to a rank function r, also received as input. The tuple is then
used by DefeasibleEntailment to determine whether or not K entails a
query taken as input. It does so in the same manner as RationalClosure,
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by removing statements until finding a logically equivalent ranked subset ofÐ→K that classically entails the material counterpart of the query. Hence, the
output of the Rank function may not necessarily look like
Ð→K , but will be
logically equivalent [26]:
Lemma 5.2.1. Let (R0, ...,Rn−1,R∞, n) be the output from the Rank algo-
rithm, given a defeasible knowledge base K and a K-faithful rank function rK.
Then {R∞} ∪⋃j<ni=0 {Rj} ≡
Ð→K .
This next theorem is a type of representation theorem for basic defea-
sible entailment, tying the semantics, the rank function, and the algorithm
together.
Theorem 5.3. The following statements are equivalent:
1. ∣≈ is a basic defeasible entailment relation
2. there is a K-faithful ranked model R and a K-faithful rank function r
such that:
(a) r(α) = min{i ∣ there is a v ∈ α̂ such that R(v) = i};
(b) ∣≈ can be generated from R;
(c) ∣≈ can be generated from r;
(d) ∣≈ can be computed by DefeasibleEntailment, given K and r as
input.
The above theorem ties together the semantics behind basic defeasible en-
tailment, the definition of basic defeasible entailment using ranks on propo-
sitions, and the algorithmic definition. A corollary of this theorem, using
points 1 and 2b, is that basic defeasible entailment satisfies the following
property:
Corollary 5.3.1.
Any basic defeasible entailment relation ∣≈, satisfies the following property,
called rank extension: if K ∣≈R α ∣∼ β, then K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β
This is shown by noting that if K ∣≈R α ∣∼ β, then the defeasible implication
α ∣∼ β is satisfied by every ranked model of K, including the ranked model
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that defines ∣≈. Rank extension defines the monotonic core of ∣≈, and requires
it to extend preferential entailment.
To compare this algorithm to the RationalClosure algorithm, consider
the knowledge base: K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats, ¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼ , leaky ∣∼
¬floats, FlyingDutchman ∣∼ leaky}, along with the same query as before:
FlyingDutchman ∣∼ ¬floats. Then, the material counterpart to K is Ð→K ∶=
{boat→ floats, ¬(leaky→ boat)→ , leaky→ ¬floats, FlyingDutchman
→ leaky}, and the material counterpart to the query is FlyingDutchman →
¬floats. Then, consider the following K-faithful ranked interpretation of K,
RK:
∞ blfd blfd blfd blfd
3 blfd blfd blfd
2 blfd blfd blfd
1 blfd blfd blfd
0 blfd blfd blfd
RK then informs a corresponding K-faithful rank function rK, by theorem
5.3, such that:
• rK(boat ∧ leaky) = rK(boat ∧ ¬floats) = 1
• rK(FlyingDutchman ∧ ¬leaky) = rK(boat ∧ leaky ∧ floats) = 2
• rK((boat ∧ FlyingDutchman) ∧ (leaky ↔ floats)) = rK((floats ∧
FlyingDutchman) ∧ ¬boat) = 3
• rK(¬(leaky→ boat)) =∞
Therefore, given K and rK as input, Rank will produce the following Rs:
• R0 ≡ ¬((boat∧leaky)∨(boat∧¬floats)) ≡ ¬(boat∧leaky)∧¬(boat∧
¬floats)
• R1 ≡ ¬((FlyingDutchman ∧ ¬leaky) ∨ boat ∧ leaky ∧ floats) ≡
(¬FlyingDutchman ∨ leaky) ∧ ¬(boat ∧ leaky ∧ floats)
• R2 ≡ ¬(((boat ∧ FlyingDutchman) ∧ (leaky↔ floats)) ∨ ((floats ∧
FlyingDutchman)∧¬boat)) ≡ (¬(boat∧FlyingDutchman)∨¬(leaky↔
floats)) ∧ (¬(floats ∧ FlyingDutchman) ∨ boat)
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• R∞ ≡ ¬(¬(leaky→ boat)) ≡ leaky→ boat
Additionally, Rank will output n = 3. Then, the DefeasibleEntailment
algorithm takes as input K, the query FlyingDutchman ∣∼ ¬floats, and rK,
and uses the Rank function to obtain (R0,R1,R2,R∞, n). Then, similarly
to RationalClosure, DefeasibleEntailment finds the first k, such that
{R∞}∪⋃j<ni=k {Ri} ⊧ FlyingDutchman→ ¬floats. First, the algorithm will set
R = R0∪R1∪R2. A visualization of R∪R∞ is as follows, with FlyingDutchman
abbreviated as FD:
∞ leaky→ boat
2 (¬(boat ∧ FD) ∨ ¬(leaky↔ floats)) ∧ (¬(floats ∧ FD) ∨ boat)
1 (¬FD ∨ leaky) ∧ ¬(boat ∧ leaky ∧ floats)
0 ¬(boat ∧ leaky) ∧ ¬(boat ∧ ¬floats)
First, DefeasibleEntailment checks if R ∪ R∞ ⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman.
There are only three valuations that satisfy R ∪R∞, all of which are models
of ¬FlyingDutchman. Since R is not empty, the algorithm will then remove
R0 from R, leaving the following R ∪R∞:
∞ leaky→ boat
2 (¬(boat ∧ FD) ∨ ¬(leaky↔ floats)) ∧ (¬(floats ∧ FD) ∨ boat)
1 (¬FD ∨ leaky) ∧ ¬(boat ∧ leaky ∧ floats)
Again, the algorithm will check whether R ∪ R∞ ⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman.
This time, there is a model of R ∪R∞, blfd, that does not satisfy the for-
mula ¬FlyingDutchman, and therefore R ∪R∞ /⊧ ¬FlyingDutchman. Then,
DefeasibleEntailment checks if R ∪ R∞ ⊧ FlyingDutchman → ¬floats,
which is the case as every model of R1∪R2∪R∞ is a model of FlyingDutchman
→ ¬floats, and therefore DefeasibleEntailment returns true.
Now, having defined the class of basic defeasible entailment, does it satisfy
the goal laid out at the beginning of this section by removing all nonsensical
defeasible entailments? It appears that while it is a good effort, it is still too
permissive. To illustrate why, an example [26]:
2 pbf
1 pbf pbf
0 pbf pbf pbf
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2 pbf
1 pbf pbf pbf
0 pbf pbf
Above are two ranked interpretations of the knowledge base K ∶= {p →
b, b ∣∼ f, p ∣∼ ¬f} [26]. One of which, RKRC , is the minimal ranked model, cor-
responding to the rational closure, and the other, RK is a K-faithful ranked
model, which corresponds to a basic defeasible entailment relation. Now,
RKRC ⊩ ¬p∧¬f ∣∼ ¬β, which means that K ∣≈RC ¬p∧¬f ∣∼ ¬b, i.e., that objects
that are not ps and not fs are typically not bs either is in the rational clo-
sure of K. However, note that the K-faithful ranked model does not agree.
RK /⊩ ¬p ∧ ¬f ∣∼ ¬b, and therefore the basic defeasible entailment relation
defined by the K-faithful ranked model does not entail this defeasible impli-
cation. The takeaway is that basic defeasible entailment does not guarantee
that at least the defeasible implications entailed by rational closure will be
inferred. The significance of this is related to the significance of rational clo-
sure as a nonmonotonic core for defeasible entailment [26]. Rational closure
is defined by the minimal ranked interpretation of a knowledge base, and in
that sense represents the minimum that should be entailed by a nonmono-
tonic entailment. Any entailment relation that entails at least as much as
the rational closure should be a reasonable entailment relation, but basic
defeasible entailment does not guarantee that, which implies that a subset
of basic defeasible entailment will entail not much more than ranked entail-
ment. This implies that a stronger class of defeasible entailment relations
should be defined, one that enforces rational closure as a nonmonotonic core.
5.4.2 Rational Defeasible Entailment
Given the argument for rational closure as a nonmonotonic core of defeasible
entailment, it is natural to formulate it as a core property for the next class
of defeasible entailment:
Definition 5.14.
Rational Closure Extension (RC Extension): given a defeasible knowledge
base K and a defeasible entailment relation ∣≈, it holds that ∣≈ satisfies rational
closure extension if it is the case that if K ∣≈RC α ∣∼ β then K ∣≈ α ∣∼ β.
RC extension simply requires that a defeasible entailment relation extends
the rational closure of K. If a basic defeasible entailment relation satisfies
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RC Extension, then it is a rational defeasible entailment relation. Rational
defeasible entailment relations can be characterised semantically as a subset
of K-faithful ranked interpretations satsifying the following property:
Definition 5.15.
Rank Preservation: A ranked interpretation R is rank preserving if for all




(u) then RK(v) <RK(u)
Rank preservation is an interesting property, and, informally, states that
a rank preserving ranked model is one that respects the relative rankings
between each pair of valuations defined in the minimal ranked interpretation
RKRC .
Naturally, rational defeasible entailment can then also be characterised
in terms of the rank function r if it satisfies the corresponding property of
being base rank preservation:
Definition 5.16. A rank function r is said to be base rank preserving if for
all α,β ∈ L, brK(α) < brK(β), then r(α) < r(β).
Base rank preserving rank functions assign ranks to formulas that respect
the relative rankings between formulas assigned by the base rank function,
analogously to rank preservation described previously for the semantics.
To illustrate rank preservation, consider the following two ranked models,
with valuations of infinite rank omitted for brevity, of the knowledge base
K ∶= {¬(p→ b) ∣∼ , b ∣∼ f, p ∣∼ ¬f}:
2 pbf
1 pbf pbf





The top ranked model is the minimal ranked model of K, RKRC , and
the bottom ranked model is a constructed ranked model of K, RK, defining a
rational defeasible entailment relation. Note that for every u, v ∈ U , wherever
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RKRC(u) < RKRC(v) then also RK(u) < RK(v). Therefore, RK is a rank-
preserving ranked model of K. This leads to the primary theorem defining
rational defeasible entailment:
Theorem 5.4. The following statements are equivalent:
1. ∣≈ is a rational defeasible entailment relation
2. there is a rank preserving K-faithful ranked interpretation R and a base
rank preserving K-faithful rank function r such that:
(a) r(α) = min{i ∣ v ∈ JαK and R(v) = i};
(b) ∣≈ can be generated from R;
(c) ∣≈ can be generated from r;
(d) ∣≈ can be computed from DefeasibleEntailment, given K and r
as input.
The above theorem is completely analogous to the theorem defining ba-
sic defeasible entailment, the only changes are the new properties defined
with which r and R should comply. Of note, is that the previously defined
algorithm DefeasibleEntailment, can of course also compute any ratio-
nal defeasible entailment relation given an appropriate, K-faithful base rank
preserving rank function.
5.5 Other Nonmonotonic Entailment Relations
5.5.1 Lexicographic Closure
Lehmann [48] proposed an entailment relation using the framework defined
by Lehmann and Magidor [49] to formalize the pattern of default reasoning
as described by Reiter [61]. First, Lehmann described informal, intuitive
properties that underpin default reasoning, and that should therefore guide
the definition of lexicographic closure. They are:
1. the presumption of typicality
2. the presumption of independence
3. priority to typicality
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4. respect for specificity
The presumption of typicality can be thought of as a stronger assumption
of monotonicity in the absence of any information to the contrary. Ratio-
nal monotonicity states that it is possible to accept new information with-
out changing a conclusion on the condition that the new information does
not contradict with any existing information. However, it does not unam-
biguously inform what should be derived, due to its nature as a negative
inference rule. Given a knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats} and an
LM-rational entailment relation ∣≈, both K ∣≈ boat ∧ sailors ∣∼ floats or
K ∣≈ boat ∣∼ ¬sailors could be acceptable inferences using rational mono-
tonicity. The presumption of typicality states that the former should be
preferred, as there is no strong justification to accept the latter instead [48].
The presumption of independence strengthens the tendency towards mono-
tonicity established by the presumption of typicality. The presumption of
independence broadly says to presume typicality for every consequent unless
there is a reason for the contrary. Following from the previous example, if
there is a K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,boat ∣∼ ¬sailors} then the presumption of
typicality cannot be used to support K ∣≈ boat∧sailors ∣∼ floats since there
is already explicitly boat ∣∼ ¬sailors in the knowledge base. The presump-
tion of independence states that since the relationship between sailors and
floats is not known, it should be assumed that sailors has no relation to
floats, and therefore boat ∧ sailors ∣∼ floats should be accepted, despite
the fact that ¬sailors is known to be a typical consequence of boat.
Priority to typicality resolves conflict between the presumption of typical-
ity and presumption of independence. Given two inferences, one derived from
the presumption of typicality and the other derived from presumption of in-
dependence, priority to typicality states that the former should be preferred.
Consider the knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,boat∧ leaky ∣∼ ¬floats}
then the presumption of typicality suggests that boat ∧ leaky ∧ sailors ∣∼
¬floats is inferred, and the presumption of independence offers both boat∧
leaky∧sailors ∣∼ ¬floats and also boat∧leaky∧sailors ∣∼ floats. Since
it is not justified to accept both, as deriving both a formula and its negation
results in an unsatisfiable knowledge base, priority to typicality concludes
that the former should hold.
Lastly, respect for specificity states that given any two clashing infer-
ences, the inference based on the defeasible implication with a more specific
antecedent should be preferred. The exact nature of what it means for an
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inference to be “based on” a defeasible implication is difficult to formal-
ize, and is guided mostly by intuition. Furthermore, there seems to be a
close relationship between this principle and the priority to typicality. Fol-
lowing the priority to typicality generally gives us exactly the results one
would expect from respect for specificity. Note in the example above for
priority to typicality, the accepted inference was derived from the more spe-
cific boat ∧ leaky ∣∼ ¬floats over boat ∣∼ floats. Intuitively, a leaky boat
is more specific than a, presumably, regular boat. Formally, boat ∧ leaky
is more information than boat, and so clearly is more specific. However,
not all cases are so clear. It is possible to have a knowledge base such as
K ∶= {bird ∣∼ fly,penguin ∣∼ bird∧¬fly,tweety∧bird ∣∼ fly}, where speci-
ficity is not as obvious. Is tweety on the same level of specificity as penguin?
It is not, it is less specific, but tweety∧bird is as specific as penguin, which
is less obvious by just looking at the formulas.
Another, more informal principle worth mentioning is dubbed avoidance
of junk. This principle states that the closed set of statements produced
by an entailment relation on a knowledge base should be minimal in the
set-theoretic sense of the term: that no strict subset should be acceptable.
The essential meaning of this principle is that spurious inferences should be
avoided.
Recall that the base rank function br is a ranking function defined to
describe rational closure. Then for any defeasible knowledge base, the order
of the knowledge base is defined as [48]:
Definition 5.17. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, the order of a knowl-
edge base, k, is the maximum base rank assigned to a formula in the knowledge
base, not including ∞, such that kK ∶= max{br(α) ∣ α ∣∼ β ∈ K, br(α) ∈ N}.
The aim now is to find a ranked interpretation, RLC , that corresponds to
the lexicographic closure. Finding a ranked interpretation is essentially find-
ing a modular ordering, that shall be denoted ≺LC , over a set of valuations
V ⊆ U . It should be clear that there will be valuations that violate some
subset of defeasible implications, D ⊆ K, and so the modular ordering over
these valuations will be informed by ordering the subsets of defeasible im-
plications violated. To order these subsets, a measure of “seriousness” needs
to be defined, violating a more “serious” set of defeasible implications is less
preferable, therefore a valuation that violates a less serious subset is prefer-
able to a valuation that violates a more serious subset of D. Seriousness is
defined on the following two metrics [48]:
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• the size of the set: violating a subset with a smaller cardinality is less
serious than violating that of a larger cardinality.
• the specificity of the elements: it is less serious to violate a less specific
statement than a more specific one. Specificity here is informed by the
base rank of the statement.
Having defined two metrics to provide the ordering ≺LC , the question now
is how to compose them into a single ordering? Here is where this entail-
ment relation gets its name: a lexicographic composition, where the second
criterion, specificity, is treated as the major discriminator, and then the first
criterion as a secondary discriminator when two valuations are equivalent
according to the first. The motivation here is that it should be preferable to
violate two defeasible statements of low specificity to violating a single one
of higher specificity.
Now that the intuition behind such a “seriousness” ordering has been
described, what follows is a more formal definition. First, a definition for the
seriousness of subsets of defeasible implications. Note that for any set X,
then ∣X ∣ denotes the cardinality of X:
Definition 5.18. Given a defeasible knowledge base K of order k, every
subset D ⊆ K has a corresponding k+1 tuple of natural numbers, denoted nD,
⟨n0, ..., nk⟩, where each is defined as such: n0 = ∣{α ∣∼ β ∈ D ∣ brK(α) = ∞}∣,
n1 = ∣{α ∣∼ β ∈ D ∣ brK(α) = k − 1}∣ and for any i = 1, ..., k, ni = ∣{α ∣∼ β ∈
D ∣ brK(α) = k − i}∣. That is, n0 is the number of defeasible implications of
infinite base rank, or having no rank, in D, and each ni for 0 < i ≤ k is the
number of defeasible implications of base rank k − i in D.
This definition gives, for any set of defeasible information D a correspond-
ing tuple nD, that can be used to compare D to some other set of defeasible
implications, B, and allows for a preference order that is defined, as men-
tioned above, lexicographically. Starting from the highest rank, ∞, to the
lowest rank 0, if at any point there is a higher number in nD than nB for a
particular rank, then B ≺S D. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 5.19. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, a seriousness order-
ing on subsets D ⊆ K is a modular partial ordering, denoted ≺S, that is a
lexicographic ordering over the tuples of ranks for each subset. That is, given
two subsets, D1,D2 ⊆ K, D1 ≺S D2 if and only if nD1 ≺S nD2 using the natural
lexicographic ordering over tuples of natural numbers, e.g. ⟨1,0,2⟩ ≺S ⟨1,1,2⟩.
≺S is a strict modular partial order over subsets of K.
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The intuition behind the seriousness ordering is that for two subsets
D1,D2 ⊆ K, if D1 ≺S D2 then there is a base rank i for which D2 has a
higher number of formulas, and for all ranks higher than i, including ∞, D1
and D2 have the same number of formulas.
This seriousness ordering over subsets of a defeasible knowledge base K
allows for the definition of a basis [48] for a formula in K:
Definition 5.20. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and a formula α,
then a subset B ⊆ K, is referred to as a basis for α if and only if the material
counterpart of B,
Ð→
B , is consistent with α, i.e.,
Ð→
B /⊧ ¬α, and also B is
maximal with respect to the seriousness ordering, i.e., there is no B′ such
that B ≺S B′ where ≺S is the seriousness ordering.
For some formula α, a basis is a subset of the defeasible knowledge base
such that α is consistent, i.e., its negation is not entailed, and, if br(α) = i,
then for any j ≥ i, it is the case that EKj ⊆ B, i.e., that B contains at least all
statements in K of rank equal to or higher than α.
Using this definition of a basis, lexicographic closure can be defined using
the following theorem from Lehmann [48]:
Theorem 5.5. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and a defeasible impli-
cation α ∣∼ β, it is the case that α ∣∼ β is in the lexicographic closure of K,
denoted K ∣≈LC α ∣∼ β, if and only if for any basis B ⊆ K of α,
Ð→
B ∪ {α} ⊧ β.
The seriousness ordering defined previously can also be used to construct
a ranked interpretation of K that corresponds to lexicographic closure. This
can be formalized in the following definition from Lehmann [48] as well as
Casini et al. [26]:
Definition 5.21. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and valuations m,n ∈
U , the preference order ≺LC over U is defined as: m ≺LC n if and only if
V (m) ≺S V (n) where V (m) ⊆ K is the set of defeasible implications violated
by m ∈ U . ≺LC is a modular partial order over U , and so defines a ranked
interpretation, denoted RKLC. RKLC is K-faithful and rank preserving.
This ranked interpretation defines an entailment relation that is exactly
lexicographic closure:
Definition 5.22. Given a knowledge base K, a defeasible implication α ∣∼ β,
and a ranked interpretation RKLC of K, it holds that K ∣≈LC α ∣∼ β if and only
if RKLC ⊩ α ∣∼ β.
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Since lexicographic closure can be defined by a ranked interpretation, it is
therefore LM-rational, and was shown to satisfy RC Extension by Lehmann
[48], by noting that the previously defined seriousness order can also be used
to define rational closure.
It also follows from this that there should be a rank function that can be
used to generate the lexicographic closure [26]:
Definition 5.23. The lexicographic rank function, rLC
K
, with respect to a
knowledge base K, is defined as rLC
K
(α) ∶= min{RKLC(v) ∣ v ∈ α̂}.
The rank function rLC is both K-faithful and base rank preserving, which
follows from the definition of lexicographic closure, as well as from lexico-
graphic closure satisfying RC Extension. Then, it follows that lexicographic
closure can be computed with the same algorithms that compute basic de-
feasible entailments:
Lemma 5.5.1. The algorithm DefeasibleEntailment returns true when
given the input K, rLC
K








These various definitions of lexicographic closure can be tied up as follows:
Theorem 5.6. Given a defeasible knowledge base K, and a defeasible impli-
cation α ∣∼ β, then the following statements are equivalent:
• K ∣≈LC α ∣∼ β





(α ∧ ¬β) or rLC
K
(α) =∞
• The algorithm DefeasibleEntailment returns true when given the
input K, rLC
K
, and α ∣∼ β.
For an example, consider the knowledge base K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,boat ∣∼
sailors,¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼ ,leaky ∣∼ ¬floats}. Then the ranked model,
with valuations of infinite rank omitted, corresponding to the lexicographic







0 blfs blfs blfs blfs blfs
While the ranked model corresponding to the rational closure, RKRC , is:
2 blfs blfs
1 blfs blfs blfs blfs
0 blfs blfs blfs blfs blfs blfs
Visually, the difference between the two ranked models is quite clear. RKLC
is more “stretched out” than RKRC , as lexicographic closure has a more fine
grained preference ordering than rational closure. This fine grained ordering
is what allows for a more presumptive reading. Consider the query leaky ∣∼
sailors. The minimal leaky valuations in RKRC are blfs blfs, and so
K /∣≈RC leaky ∣∼ sailors, however the minimal leaky valuation in RKLC is
blfs, and so it is the case that K ∣≈LC leaky ∣∼ sailors, which illustrates the
distinction between rational closure and lexicographic closure, and the effect
of a finer grained preference order.
5.5.2 Prototypical and Presumptive Entailment
Rational closure is what is termed a prototypical reading of a knowledge base.
What is meant by this is that rational closure will infer as few a number of
defeasible inferences relative to other ranked interpretations, a product of
rational closure corresponding to the minimal ranked interpretation, and
so is the most prototypical defeasible entailment relation, representing the
most conservative pattern of defeasible reasoning. It can also be seen in
comparing the br ranking function to other general ranking functions r. br
is the function that “pushes down” the ranks of the formulas as much as
possible, as a result of RRC , which pushes down the ranks of the valuation
the most. Prototypical reading is called as such since it describes how ∣∼ is
interpreted. Under a prototypical reading, α ∣∼ β is read as “typically, given
α it is possible to conclude that β is the case”. This interpretation informs
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why rational closure draws as few inferences as possible: if there is some
γ that is an abnormal α, rational closure concludes that it is not possible
to conclude any γ ∣∼ β for any β on the basis that α ∣∼ β is derivable from
the knowledge base, as the prototypical reading states that it is only from a
typical α from which β can be inferred.
On the other hand, there is a presumptive reading of ∣∼, which means that
α ∣∼ β is read as “from α, β can be presumed unless stated otherwise”, which
is a fundamental difference in the interpretation of ∣∼. Lexicographic closure
represents a presumptive reading of ∣∼, as it is willing to conclude as much
as possible from even an atypical α. For example, lexicographic closure will
conclude that a penguin has wings, despite being an abnormal, in this case
flightless, bird.
A natural question is whether lexicographic closure is the most presump-
tive entailment. The immediate answer is that it is not. Consider the
ranked interpretation above from which lexicographic closure is generated, it
is clear that it is not the most granulated ranked interpretation that could
be constructed. Consider the ranked interpretation, RK, below of the same
knowledge base, K ∶= {boat ∣∼ floats,boat ∣∼ sailors,¬(leaky → boat) ∣∼








0 blfs blfs blfs blfs blfs
The above ranked model of K is a refinement of the ranked model RKLC ,
and as such is K-faithful and base rank preserving, and therefore generates a
rational defeasible entailment relation, ∣≈R. It can be shown that ∣≈R extends
lexicographic closure, i.e., that if K ∣≈LC α ∣∼ β then K ∣≈R α ∣∼ β by comparing
it to RKLC in the previous section, and is, in fact, more presumptive than lex-
icographic closure. For example, note that K ∣≈R boat∧¬floats∧sailors ∣∼
¬leaky, that a boat with sailors that does not float is typically not leaky,
but K /∣≈LC boat ∧ ¬floats ∧ sailors ∣∼ ¬leaky.
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Prototypical and presumptive entailment relations form a spectrum of
patterns of reasoning. Rational closure has been shown to be the most pro-
totypical entailment relation and so forms the one end of the spectrum, how-
ever it has been demonstrated that lexicographic closure is not the most
presumptive. The implication is that the number of even just rational de-
feasible entailment relations is quite large, and given a defeasible knowledge
base there are many ranked models that can be constructed, with each one
representing a defeasible entailment relation with a different reading of ∣∼, de-
pending on whether it represents information about the way things typically
are, or the way things may be presumed to be.
5.5.3 Other Types of Closure
Rational closure and lexicographic closure are the entailment relations de-
fined by KLM [46] and Lehmann [48], respectively, in this framework.
However, the framework has been shown to be far broader than that. As
previously stated, rational closure is defined as being the most prototypical
consequence relation, and lexicographic closure a presumptive relation. The
natural question is then: what various entailment relations are there, and
how do they differ? Rational entailment, as presented previously, is intended
as a guideline for defining any entailment relation corresponding to some
pattern of reasoning. However, what will now be presented is an example of
an entailment constructed differently to what has been described, but still
using the KLM framework.
5.5.4 Relevant Closure
An interesting entailment relation is relevant closure, first described by Casini
et al.[25]. Consider the problem where a subset of properties should be in-
herited by an atypical example. Given that birds have wings and fly, and
that an ostrich is a bird that does not fly, we would ideally want to inherit
that they still have wings, even though they are an atypical bird. Rational
closure will not conclude that ostriches have wings, as it is the most proto-
typical reading of the knowledge. There are a number of other presumptive
entailments that are willing to draw such an inference, however relevant clo-
sure provides an elegant, different reading that attempts to respect where
rational closure is correct to be prototypical, but still add presumptive in-
ferences that are based on a notion of relevance attached to each statement.
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This puts it somewhere in between rational closure and lexicographic closure
on the spectrum of prototypical and presumptive entailments.
Relevant closure is defined algorithmically and operates by identifying
a subset of defeasible statements that are relevant to a given query, and
applies a version of the DefeasibleEntailment algorithm to the knowledge
base such that only those relevant statements may be removed. Given a
defeasible knowledge base K, and a query α ∣∼ β, then identify some R ⊂ K
that is the subset of defeasible statements relevant to the query. R therefore
is partitioned by the base rank of the formulas, the same base rank, br, that
defines the rational closure, and each rank is removed in the usual way as in
DefeasibleEntailment until there is some rank of R together with K ∖ R
that entails the query, and if there is no such rank then it is not entailed.
However, relevant closure has some limitations. Firstly, it is not LM-
rational, as it does not satisfy Or, Cautious Monotonicity, and Rational
Monotonicity. This is not inherently undesirable, but means that the pref-
erential semantics for defeasible entailment presented here does not describe
relevant closure.
Relevant closure is emblematic of the utility of KLM-style frameworks.
Not every entailment relation need satisfy every postulate, nor does it need to
be defined in every available way. Rather, as long as the pattern of reasoning
is sound, or useful, then it may be defined semantically, algorithmically, proof





This dissertation has covered classical propositional logic, a class of prefer-
ential consequence relations over a propositional language, and then defined
a defeasible propositional logic over which a nonmonotonic entailment rela-
tion may be defined. Such entailment relations have been demarcated into
the various classes of LM-rational, basic defeasible entailment, and rational
defeasible entailment dependent on the sets of properties they satisfy. The
intuition presented here is that each entailment relation corresponds to some
pattern of reasoning that would fall under the broad category of “common
sense” reasoning. Not all such common sense reasoning is valid, however,
and may well be nonsensical in practice. The framework of rational defea-
sible entailment is then proposed as isolating a set of entailment relations
that are all reasonable, given the correct context. A natural question is then:
are there desirable entailment relations that are not rational or perhaps not
even a basic defeasible entailment relation? Immediately, relevant closure
should be recalled. Relevant closure is not LM-rational, and so is not a basic
defeasible entailment relation, and therefore is not a rational defeasible en-
tailment relation. However, the pattern of reasoning it encodes is reasonable,
and it does extend the rational closure. What this should illustrate, is that
this framework can be treated somewhat flexibly, as relevant closure itself is
defined using this framework, but does not fit in the classes defined thus far.
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6.1 Nonmonotonicity and defeasibility
Broadly, there are two types of reasoning at play in nonmonotonic reasoning:
defeasible reasoning, and ampliative reasoning [21]. A defeasible inference
is simply one that may be later retracted. Defeasibility can then be seen as
a meta-level notation over a meta-level or object-level statement: explicitly
noting that an inference may be retracted on learning new information, or
that this explicit information represents knowledge that holds in the most
typical, or preferred, situations, but may not be the case in more atypical
situations. This added expressivity is what translates to “common-sense”
statements about the way things usually are, rather than classical statements
that necessarily hold in all cases.
The other side of this nonmonotonic coin is ampliative reasoning [21].
Ampliativity is the property of inferring more information than another en-
tailment relation given the same knowledge. Compare presumptive entail-
ments, such as lexicographic closure, inferring more statements than the ra-
tional closure. The exact relationship between ampliativity and defeasibility
can be challenging to define. Intuitively, they seem to be heavily related,
and in some way dependent on each other. Ampliativity implies a level of
defeasibility: any ampliative inference likely should be defeasible, as its na-
ture implies that it is already inferred on less than concrete grounds, and it
is highly likely that there exists additional information that could cause a
contradiction. Then, does defeasibility imply ampliativity? This is perhaps
a harder question. It is possible to conceive of a defeasible statement that
is not particularly ampliative, consider a defeasible inference to a defeasible
knowledge base that is logically equivalent to a classical statement, but the
real murkiness is the exact definition of an ampliative statement. If amplia-
tivity is defined as being those inferences not in the monotonic core of a
knowledge base, which is relatively intuitive, then there do exist defeasible
statements that are not ampliative, which suggests that defeasibility does
not quite imply ampliativity.
As covered in chapter 3, there are a number of approaches and formalisms
that model nonmonotonic reasoning patterns. One interesting point to note
is how defeasibility may be encoded on the object-level of a logic. Two ex-
amples to illustrate this point are: propositional typicality logic (PTL) [11]
represents defeasibility by means of a unary operator ● that can be placed
before any formula in the language. Another example is defeasible descrip-
tion logics, which has defeasible connectives different from implication, or
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subsumption as it is referred to in description logics [16]. Compare these
two approaches to the KLM framework, where object-level defeasibility is
encoded solely in the connective for defeasible implication ∣∼. This allows
solely for a statement such as α ∣∼ β, which conveys that “α typically im-
plies β”, or “typical αs are βs” [49]. Whereas the other two approaches
allow for expressing defeasible statements on the object-level that cannot be
expressed in this framework, for example “all αs are the most typical βs”
[11]. How defeasibility is encoded in the language itself is a non-trivial fac-
tor in a nonmonotonic logic, and different frameworks can have significantly
different expressivity with respect to the defeasible statements that may be
represented.
6.2 Summary of Contribution
This dissertation is intended to be a complete overview of the KLM frame-
work for defeasible reasoning, at the time of writing. The primary goal is that
this will be useful as a reference for defining defeasible entailment relations,
perhaps for an application such as a defeasible reasoning engine, as well as a
pedagogical tool that can take any reader from classical propositional logic
to rational defeasible entailment using the KLM framework. Since the KLM
framework was initially defined, different research groups have built exten-
sions using those foundations. Compiling this work into a single overview
should prove useful for future work in this research area, by homogenizing
the notation used, while still providing the context for the notation in the ini-
tial papers, as well as by providing clarity on subjects that may have proven
confusing on first encounter.
6.3 Future Work
Some primary areas of interest for future work in this field include syntax
sensitivity, applications in other domains, and explainability.
Syntax sensitivity is the property that the representation of some subset of
formulas in a knowledge base affects what is entailed, in the context of syntax-
based approaches to entailment [6, 7]. For example, the lexicographic closure
is sensitive to the way the knowledge base represents statements. Rational
closure, on the other hand, is not at all sensitive, and will entail the same set
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of inferences regardless of the way the information is expressed, provided the
information itself is not changed. Solving syntax sensitivity in presumptive
entailments will make these entailment relations more reliable and predictable
in behaviour, allowing them to be far more viable in implementations such
as reasoning engines.
An area of research that was touched upon in parts of this dissertation is
defeasible description logics [16, 21, 27]. While defeasible TBox statements
(comparable to propositional knowledge bases) have been defined [15, 18], an
ongoing area of research is that of defeasible ABox reasoning [13, 17]. While
reasoning with a classical ABox has been defined [13], defining reasoning
with respect to a defeasible ABox is an open question [14, 39]. Additionally,
there is also the opportunity to do the kind of work of this dissertation
in the context of description logics: compiling the various ways KLM-style
defeasibility has been incorporated in description logics and providing an
overview.
Two active applications of this kind of defeasible reasoning are in the legal
domain [41], and in logic programming, specifically using datalog [32, 42].
Legal reasoning is applying formal logic to reasoning about laws and norma-
tive systems, and frequently the problem of conflicting obligations arises in
various paradoxes [60], and defeasible reasoning has been shown to have suc-
cess in resolving some such paradoxes [29]. Datalog is a logic programming
language that was originally designed as a database querying language, but
has found applications in artificial intelligence, notably in RDFox [59] and
the DLV system [50]. Datalog has been shown to be extendable to compute
the rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base [42], which has implica-
tions for how KLM-style defeasible reasoning approaches can be incorporated
into various reasoning engines.
Finally, explainable artificial intelligence [43] in this context refer to
enriching some reasoning engine with the ability to provide, for all entail-
ments, justifications: a minimal subset of the knowledge base that supports
an inference. The goals of explainability are, broadly speaking, to under-
stand entailments that are not obviously inferred by the knowledge, to fix a
possibly bugged, or inconsistent, knowledge base, and to gain some better
understanding of a knowledge base with which the user may not have prior
experience [43]. So far, the majority of work in explainable AI has been in
the context of classical reasoning [47], however there is foundational work
on extending explainability to the realm of defeasibility [12, 28].
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6.4 Conclusion
This dissertation started with classical propositional logic, and then showed
how to construct a preferential consequence relation over such a language,
with corresponding semantics. Then, the language was extended with a
defeasible connective to create a defeasible propositional logic, over which
nonmonotonic entailment relations were defined. These entailment relations
were then classified into iteratively defined classes. This progression is in-
tended to take the reader from the initial definitions of the KLM framework
to the current state. After this dissertation, the reader is encouraged to
read the papers defining and extending the KLM framework using this as a
reference if necessary.
The aim of this dissertation was to provide a single point of reference
that also serves as an overview of the KLM framework. The intention is that
using this as a manual of sorts allows for the reader to either manipulate the
framework for the purposes of implementing defeasible reasoning in an appli-
cation, or to assist theoretical extensions and developments of the framework
itself.
A concluding message is that every entailment relation necessarily en-
codes a pattern of reasoning. A knowledge base is essentially a representa-
tion of some information, and an entailment relation encodes a reading of
the information that determines what type of reasoning is employed. De-
feasible entailment relations, therefore, should be viewed not only as classes,
defined by postulates describing the associated behaviour, but also as dis-
tinct reasoning patterns that may or may not be sensible. No one type of
defeasible entailment is a one size fits all, and what type of entailment rela-
tion is desirable is domain dependent, comparable to how human reasoning
is context dependent. It follows that defeasible entailment is the study of
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